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MEDICAL MALOCCURRENCE 
INSURANCE: A FIRST PARTY NO-
FAULT INSURANCE PROPOSAL 
FOR RESOLVING THE MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 
CONTROVERSY 
Medical malpractice liability has been a continuing source of 
controversy and crisis ever since medical malpractice insurance 
rates skyrocketed in 1974. The current system finds few defend-
ers among health care providers, injured patients, insurance 
companies, and even attorneys. Health care providers complain 
bitterly of enormous malpractice insurance premium costs, di-
minished insurance availability, and an increasingly heavy bar-
rage of malpractice suits. Insurance companies claim that in-
creased loss ratios and restrictive state regulation have made 
medical malpractice insurance underwriting unprofitable and 
burdensome. Plaintiffs complain that the present tort system is 
an unfair, unpredictable, and cumbersome lottery that delays 
resolution for years and awards compensation disproportionately 
to similarly situated plaintiffs. In the face of such expensive, dif-
ficult, and unpredictable litigation, even personal injury attor-
neys are loath to accept any but the most attractive malpractice 
cases. 
Recent tort reforms have proved inadequate to resolve such 
difficulties. Current proposals unfairly benefit some groups at 
the expense of others, without treating the medical malpractice 
system comprehensively. 
This Note proposes a novel solution1 to the medical malprac-
tice conundrum: a patient-derived (first party) "no-fault" insur-
1. Although some approaches come close, no one seems to have quite hit upon the 
combination of first party, mandatory no-fault insurance. Danzon, for example, discusses 
the respective strengths and weaknesses of both third party no-fault and an elective con-
tractual system of patient-derived-yet third party-no-fault insurance coverage. P. 
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 208-19 (1985). 
Yet in distinguishing no-fault auto insurance plans from no-fault iatrogenic injury 
plans, Danzon notes in passing that 
[i)n no-fault automobile plans, the injured party is compensated without regard 
to his fault through his own first party insurance. Thus ... third-party liability 
1245 
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ance system to compensate victims of iatrogenic maloccurrence,2 
regardless of negligence.3 Basically, this proposal would require 
patients seeking admission to a hospital or treatment from a 
physician to purchase an insurance policy covering at least that 
particular course of treatll).ent or operation," if they did not al-
ready have comprehensive medical maloccurrence insurance. 
The policy would be no-fault, in that negligence or fault on 
the part of the health care providers would be irrelevant; the 
insured patient would be covered for any adverse medical out-
come due to treatment. The causal relationship between medical 
intervention and adverse medical outcome would be presumed 
unless the outcome was an unavoidable consequence of a preex-
isting condition or a reasonably anticipated result of treatment. 
A patient could purchase an unlimited amount of coverage over 
the minimum. A range of coverage alternatives would be made 
available, from a restricted, economic-damages-only policy, to a 
"full-coverage" policy covering noneconomic damages, such as 
pain and suffering, up to a specified policy limit. 
Part I of this Note examines the broad, underlying themes of 
tort theory and argues that, in general, the tort system's primary 
responsibility should be compensation, rather than deterrence of 
through tort is replaced by mandatory first party insurance. In the medical con-
text, by contrast, the proposal is to make medical providers liable without regard 
to their fault. This might more correctly be called strict provider liability, akin 
to strict liability of employers for work-related injuries under workers' 
compensation. 
Id. at 214. 
The obvious has been overlooked: why not apply the no-fault automobile model in all 
its first party purity? Replacing the third party medical malpractice system with a first 
party no-fault system combines the respective strengths of the various prior proposals 
without their weaknesses. 
2. As used herein, "iatrogenic" means an injury proximately resulting from the course 
of medical treatment. 
3. It is important to distinguish between "strict liability" and a "no-fault" scheme 
(though both terms mean awarding compensation without regard to the fault of the de-
fendant). Ideally, 
"no-fault" signifies a first party model under which the claimant no longer looks, 
like a tort plaintiff, to a third party or his "liability" insurer but instead to a 
non-causal source of compensation whether it be a first party policy covering all 
occupants of a car (as in the United States) or a specific central fund (as in 
Saskatchewan or Victoria (Australia)) or branch of the general social security 
system, as in New Zealand . . . . 
Fleming, The Pearson Report: Its "Strategy," 42 Moo. L. REV. 249, 260 (1979). 
Quite often, however, the term "no-fault" is applied indiscriminately to both first 
party and third party insurance plans. Cf. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 208-19 (distin-
guishing no-fault auto insurance from no-fault malpractice insurance proposals). 
4. Alternatively, the system might be formulated to allow patients to waive their tort 
rights in lieu of purchasing such insurance. But see infra notes 156-59 and accompanying 
text. 
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risk taking. In so far as the production of goods and services 
causes injury, such losses should be shared and spread as widely 
and proportionately as possible. Part II discusses the history and 
nature of the medical malpractice insurance crisis. Part III eval-
uates the numerous systemic solutions suggested by various 
commentators. Finally, Part IV proposes a new solution: first 
party, no-fault medical maloccurrence insurance (MMI). 
I. JUSTIFYING COMPENSATION 
This Part argues that, as the present tort system produces in-
significant loss deterrence, the primary function of modern tort 
law is cost/loss allocation. The current system should be re-
placed whenever an alternative system would perform this func-
tion more fairly and efficiently.11 
Any system of compensation must first answer the normative 
question, "Why compensate X?" At present, tort law predomi-
nantly gives a fault-based or negligence justification for compen-
sation, but, within the last thirty years, the emphasis has in-
creasingly shifted toward compensating injuries through the 
mechanism of strict liability. 
According to a fundamental, though often overlooked, princi-
ple of modern tort law, losses should be distributed as fairly and 
efficiently as possible. The rise of strict liability is due to recog-
nition of the utility of distributing losses over the widest possi-
ble group, which can bear them with the least disutility.6 Be-
5. Professor Sugarman makes these proposals: 
(1) [E]liminate tort remedies for accidental injuries; (2) build on existing social 
insurance and employee benefit plans to assure compensation to accident victims 
in line with compensation provided for other major causes of income loss and 
medical expense; and (3) build on existing regulatory schemes both to promote 
accident avoidance and to provide outlets for complaints about unreasonably 
dangerous conduct. 
Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 559 (1985). This Note 
disagrees with his limitation of recovery to economic damages such as "income loss and 
medical expense." Id. 
6. Strict liability as loss spreading justifies itself economically on the grounds that 
costs should be allocated so as to cause the least disruption, the least disutility. This can 
be done in three basic ways-assessing damages (1) over periods of time, (2) over the 
widest possible audience, (3) against those specific actors who can best afford them (the 
so-called "deep pockets"), or any combination of these three. 
The basic idea of wide cost spreading is the inverse of the theory of the decreasing 
marginal utility of the dollar-the increasing marginal utility of cumulative losses. 
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1972). The 
former states that a particular sum of money is of less real value to an individual the 
more he has; this is the "deep pockets" theory. The core of strict liability, however, 
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cause "the real burden of a loss is smaller the more people share 
it,"7 when some members of society suffer more than others, 
their losses should be shifted to and shared equally with the 
other members of the community, without regard to fault.8 
As a form of social engineering,9 modern tort law is inevitably 
concerned primarily with the fair and efficient distribution of so-
cial costs, that is, with the spreading of the burdens that devolve 
upon particular actors or groups of actors in society.10 Regard-
less of its particular factual and legal issues, every tort case allo-
cates the immediate burden of an injury among the interested 
parties, whether leaving it with the plaintiffs or shifting it to the 
defendants. 
Tort law clearly concerns the retroactive distribution of losses, 
but what of the principle of deterrence, of the prospective con-
trol of risks? The concept of deterrence is largely fallacious, both 
as an empirical and a theoretical matter.11 First, from an empiri-
ought to be the inverse: the less an individual has, the more each sacrifice actually hurts. 
Properly "distributing a loss 'creates' utility by shifting units of the loss to those who 
may bear them with less disutility." Id. at 547 n.40; see also Calabresi, Some Thoughts 
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-19 (1961). 
7. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 517. "The justification for allocation of losses on a 
nonfault basis . . . is that if losses are broadly spread-among people and over 
time-they are least harmful." Id.; see also Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actu-
arial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 586-87 (1961). "In 
place of the entrepreneur's deep pocket we have substituted the pocket of every man. 
His pocket may not be deep in absolute terms, but it is in relation to the amount taken 
from it." Id. 
8. For various perspectives on loss spreading and sharing, see Abel, A Socialist Ap-
proach to Risk, 41 Mo. L. REV. 695 (1982); Calabresi, supra note 6, at 517-19; Fletcher, 
supra note 6, at 547; Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 755 (1985). 
9. One commentator defines the term "social engineering" as the promotion of effi-
cient behavior. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 
CALIF. L. REV. 677 (1985). This definition is too restrictive. Social engineering is more 
properly viewed as any systematic attempt to promote the common good, rather than 
merely to resolve disputes. As Professor Owen noted in Deterrence and Desert in Tort: 
A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 665, 666 (1985), the frequently cited twin "goals" of the 
tort Jaw, compensation and deterrence, are really only "functions." Compensation, for 
example, is only appropriate if it furthers the goals of the tort system-goals dictated by 
"the common good." 
10. See Morris, supra note 7, at 556: "Clearly, we must accept [these] functional ob-
servations . . . . Shock losses are spread by way of insurance and through the channels 
of commerce, resulting in a net social gain. . . . The loss will still be spread, and that is 
the main thing." 
11. Professor Sugarman has argued this point in much greater depth than the scope 
of this Note allows. His article lists numerous reasons why tort liability actually lacks the 
deterrent value often ascribed to it: the self-preservation instinct of would-be tortfeasors, 
ordinary market forces, moral inhibitions, government regulation, ignorance, incompe-
tence, threat discounting, high stakes for tortious behavior, small penalties, and liability 
insurance. Sugarman, supra note 5, at 561-74. The approach here places more emphasis 
on what Sugarman calls "market imperfections," the argument that "tort damages will 
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cal standpoint, compensating injuries does not deter because no 
market for injury exists. The jury assesses the injury done, not 
the cost of prevention, in awarding damages. Even so, the tort 
system compensates sporadically, at best: "the extremely low 
probability of any sanction virtually nullifies the possibility of a 
general deterrent effect."12 
Furthermore, negligence-based liability will only deter "high 
attention" risk creators.13 Deterrence is unlikely to occur where 
the risk creator is unaware of both the risk and the deficiency of 
his present level of knowledge. Thus, where the injuries occurred 
when the danger was unknown, as in cases involving latently 
carcinogenic substances·, deterrence plays no role. 14 
In such cases, courts award compensation by applying the 
doctrine of strict liability. In their desire to compensate the vic-
tims of undeserved injuries, courts have accepted a variety of 
novel, elaborate strict liability arguments, such as market share 
or enterprise liability. Such cases dispense with proof of some 
traditionally essential requirements of causation, as well as proof 
of negligence. 111 
Finally, because tort law does not interfere with profit return 
over time, it fails to provide actors with a financial incentive to 
not lessen profit because the defendant will effortlessly shift those costs to its consum-
ers." Id. at 573. 
12. Abel, supra note 8, at 698-99. 
13. 
The term "high-attention risk" is used to denote an accident context in which a 
category of actors meets all of the requirements for effective cost-minimizing 
decisionmaking: typical actors must understand material risks and applicable li-
ability doctrines, must pay attention to risks and legal rules while engaged in 
risky conduct, and must assess the costs and benefits of alternative choices when 
subject to liability for a designated type of accident loss. If any of these condi-
tions is absent in a given accident setting, the risk should be characterized as 
"low attention." 
Latin, supra note 9, at 697 {footnote omitted). 
14. Often, in fact, no activity remains to deter: the corporation may be bankrupt, the 
dangerous product or condition no longer permitted. The growth of government safety 
regulation, as inadequate as it remains, is further evidence of tort law's poor record as a 
deterrent. Abel, supra note 8, at 699. 
This is not to say that tort liability does not induce any deterrence, particularly on the 
part of individual actors motivated by the normative sting and adverse publicity of a 
liability judgment. Rather, there is "little reason to believe that tort law today actually 
serves an important accident avoidance function." Sugarman, supra note 5, at 560. Fur-
thermore, as Sugarman also notes, to the extent that the imposition of liability does 
generate preventative measures, much of the efficacy of tort law deterrence may be offset 
by such socially undesirable responses as "defensive medicine." Id. at 581-83. 
15. See generally Note, The Application of a Due Diligence Requirement to Market 
Share Theory in DES Litigation, 19 U. MtcH. J.L. REF. 771 {1986) {discussing elements 
of a "market share" products liability claim). 
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avoid risks. 16 Under a system of tort liability, accident costs are 
insufficiently internalized by manufacturers, who pass the costs 
of judgments, improvements, and insurance onto consumers in 
the form of higher prices. Even in the short run, tortfeasors are 
insulated from judgments either by insurance or insolvency. In 
effect, the consumer pays for the cost of insuring himself against 
injury.17 
Because the producer-defendant class does not internalize the 
social costs of productive activity, such costs are ultimately dis-
tributed solely among the consumer-plaintiff class, and will not 
diminish the accumulation of capital within the producer-de-
fendant class.18 Therefore, costs should be spread as widely 
among consumer-plaintiffs as possible, in order to maximize effi-
ciency. According to the law of the increasing marginal utility of 
cumulative losses, to leave the burden solely on those members 
of the class who are unfortunate enough to suffer injury is less 
efficient than to spread the burden among all the members of 
the community.10 
The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. 
First party MMI simply incorporates the observation that the 
16. Admittedly, the wild card in this premise could be foreign competition, from 
countries whose workers and consumers must bear their own individual losses-allowing 
foreign business to produce even more cheaply. 
17. Fleming, supra note 3, at 263. Furthermore, even in those markets that are rela-
tively price inelastic, "the extremely low probability of any sanction virtually nullifies 
the possibility of a general deterrent effect." Abel, supra note 8, at 698-99. The tort 
system has been labelled a system of "compulsory insurance." P. DANZON, supra note 1, 
at 153. 
18. Thus, where liability is denied, the victims must bear the losses themselves. This 
is loss distribution on the basis of bad luck. If liability is found, whether under the re-
gime of negligence or of strict liability, producer-defendants generally avoid internalizing 
the costs engendered by their activities-adverse judgments, increased production costs, 
or higher insurance premiums-by charging higher prices, paying lower wages, or paying 
fewer taxes. 
What of the defendant who is unable to spread his loss or increased cost? For example, 
how does someone who causes an accident while on a Sunday drive pass his increased 
insurance cost back to the consumer-plaintiff class? The answer is that in his capacity as 
an ordinary defendant, not a producer-defendant engaged in the process of producing 
goods or services, the defendant is liable for what might be termed a "reciprocal risk." 
See Fletcher, supra note 6, at 546-47. When consumers injure each other, the burden will 
necessarily fall upon members of the consumer class, regardless of which side wins. 
When a producer injures people in the course of or as a result of his productive activ-
ity, his costs may seem to increase r2lative to those of his competitors. Statistically, how-
ever, within the same trade or industry, every producer should experience his "fair 
share" of liabilities. Over time, injuries should average out evenly enough throughout the 
industry to raise everyone's costs uniformly. Thus, the producer's costs can eventually be 
passed on to consumers, even in a competitive market. In the meantime, temporary 
losses can be carried forward for tax deductions. 
19. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
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patients, as consumers of health care, are actually paying for 
their own insurance anyway, through increased medical fees. 20 
Instead, health care consumers might fairly and more efficiently 
purchase their own insurance directly. Doing so would save both 
health care providers and patients substantial transaction costs, 
give patients greater autonomy, and provide fair compensation 
for a broader range of victims. This is the premise underlying 
first party MMI. 21 
II. CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? 
This Part examines the recent history of the medical malprac-
tice insurance predicament and suggests that its most salient 
feature is the time differential involved in passing increased pre-
mium costs to patients through higher medical costs. This prob-
lem would be solved if patients carried first party MMI because 
providers would no longer be subject to significant malpractice 
liability and would no longer have to carry primary liability 
insurance. 
A. The Cycle of Crises 
In 197 4, the issue of medical malpractice exploded across 
America as health care providers saw their medical malpractice 
liability insurance premiums increase up to 500% virtually over-
night. 22 The resulting uproar from the medical community, in-
20. This has been termed the "pass-through effect." See Zuckerman, Koller & 
Borbjerg, Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical Research on Major Policy 
Issues, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85, 106-07 (discussing pass-through of 
premium costs to patients, and noting study showing that 75% of premium increases are 
recovered from patients); see also Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 591-92; Tancredi & Barondess, The Problem of Defensive 
Medicine, 200 SCIENCE 879 (1978) ("[Malpractice insurance] costs are, to a large mea-
sure, passed on to the patient, and inevitably affect the overall cost of medical care."). 
21. See Robinson, Rethinking the Allocations of Medical Malpractice Risks Between 
Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 181-82. See gener-
ally P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 168 ("The ... argument that would design tort awards 
solely with a view to efficient compensation is ultimately an argument for abolishing the 
tort system altogether."). 
22. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 85. The sheer size of the health care industry chal-
lenges the imagination. The health care industry currently represents well over 10% of 
the gross national product. In 1982, expenditures on health care were estimated to be 
$322.4 billion per year and growing at a rate of 12.5% annually. Neubauer & Henke, 
Medical Malpractice Legislation, TRIAL, Jan. 1985, at 64, 67. In 1983, health care provid-
ers spent roughly $3 billion on liability insurance, of which physicians provided $1.7 bi!-
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eluding unprecedented mass physician walkouts,23 began a na-
tional debate on the issue that continues unabated. Efforts to 
resolve the controversy resulted in numerous state regulatory re-
forms and initiatives, such as Joint Underwriting Associations 
(JUA's),24 as well as substantial state tort law changes.25 Con-
gress has considered numerous proposals, some far-reaching, in-
cluding the Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act of 
1975,26 and the Alternative Medical Liability Act of 1985,27 
whose descendant was debated through 1986.28 
Various factors explain the sudden malpractice premium in-
creases. One commentator argues that the premiums charged for 
the period from 1969 to 1974 were grossly inadequate.29 First, 
the insurance companies undercharged according to their own 
1969 loss estimates, so that by 1975 undercharging alone re-
quired a rate increase of fifty-eight percent. The insurers se-
verely underestimated their loss ratios, however, so that by 1975 
a minimum 300% premium increase was required.30 Thus, poor 
forecasting methods, since corrected, which overlooked increased 
lion. Alternative Medical Liability Act: Hearing on H.R. 5400 Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 49 (1984) 
[hereinafter AMLA Hearings] (statements of Congressmen W. Henson Moore and Rich-
ard Gephardt). A 1985 report by the Michigan Bureau of Insurance placed the nation's 
health care bill at $350 billion, with malpractice premiums accounting for one or two 
percent of the cost. MICHIGAN INS. BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING & REGULATION, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUES 1 (1985) [hereinafter MICH. INS. BUREAU REPORT]. 
23. Throughout much of California, doctors staged a month-long protest strike 
against rising malpractice insurance rates. See Weinstein, Coast Doctors End Strike, 
Agree on Malpractice Pact, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1975, at 1, col. 4. 
24. JUA's are a kind of "assigned risk pool," which companies writing insurance in 
the state are required to join, providing emergency insurance in the absence of adequate 
voluntary coverage. FUND FoR PuB. Eouc., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LEGAL TOPICS RELATING 
TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (1977) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (report submitted to U.S. 
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare Health Care Sys. Div.); see also P. DANZON, supra note 
1, at 112. 
25. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 35. For a state by state analysis of tort law 
changes as of 1984, see AMLA Hearings, supra note 22, at 138-66; see also Strasser, Both 
Sides Brace for Tort Battle, Nat'! L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 1. 
26. This proposed legislation was actually a group of closely related bills: S. 482, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 
1975); S. 188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act of 
1975); S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (National Medical Injury Compensation Insur-
ance Act of 1975). Cf. H.R. 13870 and S. 3286, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Comprehen-
sive National Health Insurance Act of 1974). 
27. H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). 
28. H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
29. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 98-103. 
30. Id. at 99. 
SUMMER 1987] No-Fault Medical Insurance 1253 
claim frequency explain much of the rate inadequacy from 1969 
to 1974.31 
Although highly concentrated, the insurance market was-and 
still is-extremely competitive, another factor that contributed 
to rate inadequacy.32 Several aggressive companies began under-
writing malpractice insurance, and without the "long tail" of 
previous claims, these companies quickly acquired large shares 
of the market.33 In addition, medical societies exercised consid-
erable downward pressure on insurance rates. 34 
Few anticipated the increase in malpractice litigation that oc-
curred. 3G This increase was largely due to demographic factors 
such as population growth, urbanization, greater utilization of 
31. Id. at 99-100; see also R. Fleming, Final Report to Governor James J. Blanchard 
on the Subject of Health Care Provider Malpractice and Malpractice Insurance 14, 16 
(Dec. 17, 1985) (discussing reasons for the rise in malpractice insurance premiums) (copy 
on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
32. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 95. 
33. The "long tail" refers to the fact that while there is a "lag time" between 
purchase of the policy and the payment of claims against it, claims will continue to be 
made and paid for many years after the policy year. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 102. 
34. Much of the medical malpractice insurance is written as group coverage, arranged 
directly between the insurer and the state medical society. Through its organized 
strength and control over the data base, the medical society is a substantial check on the 
monopoly power of the insurer. If one company's rates are too high, the medical society 
can either take the entire program to another insurer, or insure itself by beginning a 
physician owned mutual insurance fund. Such mutuals have been formed throughout the 
country and now underwrite over 40% of the market. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 86. 
35. "(T]he principal determinants of premiums are the frequency of the claims (i.e., 
how often they are filed) and the 'severity' of the claims (i.e., how much, on average, each 
claim will cost)." R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 13. 
Although most commentators point out that claim severity and frequency are continu-
ally rising, the rates fluctuate, and adequate data are hard to find. According to Danzon, 
however, a "surge in malpractice claim frequency in the late sixties and early seventies 
culminated in the insurance crisis of 1975." P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 60. Claim fre-
quency levelled off or fell in the late seventies, but since 1977 it has been increasing at an 
estimated rate of 12% per year. Id. at 59-65, 90. 
From 1971 to 1978, cost per paid claim (awards and settlements) increased 12.4% per 
year for physicians and surgeons, and 18.9% per year for hospitals. Between 1975 and 
1978, severity grew by 30% for the average state. Severity may fluctuate wildly, however, 
among states and even particular insurance companies, due to the relatively small risk 
pool: an unusually large award in one year can significantly increase average and total 
malpractice claim losses. Id. at 65. 
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health care facilities, and the increased number of providers.36 It 
has also been blamed on liberal courts and generous juries. 37 
Insurers were willing to accept low rates, perhaps hoping that 
the cumulative difference could eventually be recouped in a 
later, more favorable insurance market, or through premium in-
vestment return. Unfortunately, in 1974, stock prices dropped 
sharply over the course of only a few months, causing substan-
tial losses to the insurance industry's investments, while under-
writing losses were reaching record levels. 38 
Rising claim costs,39 the cumulative inadequacy of insurance 
rates, and the sudden loss of capital reserves all combined to 
trigger "the filing of rate increases of several hundred percent in 
36. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 72-75. Claim frequency increases if the incidence 
of people being injured increases, if the incidence of injured people filing claims in-
creases, or if the incidence of both injuries and claims per injury increase. Id. at 65; see 
also Zuckerman, Koller & Borbjerg, supra note 20, at 93-98. 
The risk of injury due to negligent or non-negligent medical care is significant. One 
1974 California study found that "about one in twenty hospital inpatients suffers an 
injury and about one in 125 has a legal claim of malpractice." Id. at 94. Yet, according to 
Danzon, as of 1974, only one in 10 incidents of malpractice resulted in a claim, of which 
one in 25 received compensation. Even for serious injuries, at most one in seven patients 
filed claims. Assuming a steady 12% increase in claim frequency and no increase in the 
rate of injury, "a rough current estimate is that only 1 in 5 incidents of malpractice gives 
rise to a malpractice claim. Thus the cost of malpractice-the cost of injuries due to 
negligence-is probably still several times greater than the cost of malpractice claims." 
P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 25; see also R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 10 ("[P]atients are 
frequently unaware that an adverse clinical event is the result of provider negligence and 
thus avoidable." (citing studies that report from 1 in 6 to 1 in 20 malpractice incidents 
lead to claims)). 
37. Courts have evolved new theories of liability that permit recovery where formerly 
denied. Juries are arguably more aware of the defendant's insurance deep pocket, and 
more willing to award large sums. The publicity about high awards encourages further 
claimants and gives juries precedents for even higher damage awards. 
In the medical malpractice area, hospitals lost their traditional charitable immunity, 
see, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 
253 (1965), and were increasingly held responsible for the quality of its staff doctors, who 
had traditionally been considered independent contractors, see, e.g., Purcell v. 
Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972). The traditional "locality rule," judg-
ing the performance of medical professionals by the standards of their own or similarly 
situated communities, came under increasing attack by proponents of "national stan-
dards" or "specialty-wide" standards. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 
1977); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975); 
Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). 
38. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 105-07. With the premium/capital ratio reaching 4:1 
at some major carriers, "by December 1974, a 25 percent error in setting premiums" 
could result in bankruptcy, and "on the basis of past experience, an error of that magni-
tude was far from unthinkable." Id. at 107. 
39. Inflation drove up costs in general. In May 1974, the Nixon administration's Eco-
nomic Stabilization Program price controls were lifted. This released pent-up market 
forces, resulting in runaway inflation. See Rockoff, Price & Wage Controls in Four War-
time Periods, 41 J. EcoN. HlsT. 381 (1981). 
Sudden inflation, of course, greatly increased the nominal cost of insurance, thereby 
SUMMER 1987] No-Fault Medical Insurance 1255 
1974-75."40 Uncertainty as to risk exposure and frustration with 
the generally hostile state regulatory response41 led some insur-
ers to cut back on underwriting activities or to leave the market 
entirely, thus causing an "availability crisis."42 
The "crisis" of 1974 and 1975 had largely abated by 1976, but 
the calm was only temporary.43 As interest rates, and thus, pre-
mium investment income, remained at record high rates at the 
end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties, premium 
rates remained stable or even declined; but as interest rates 
dropped sharply in 1984, the continuing severity of premium 
loss ratios sparked the current round of the medical malpractice 
crisis.44 
B. The Nature of the Malpractice Insurance Crisis 
The insurance industry is cyclical because it is interwoven 
with the general business cycle through investment of its premi-
adding to the crisis atmosphere. This is merely another example of general economic 
conditions affecting the malpractice insurance industry. 
40. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 107. 
41. "[T]he percentage of the requested increase actually approved fell from 91 per-
cent in 1973 to 67 percent in 1975 .... By 1975, 18 states had approved rates that were 
161 percent below the recommended ones and the remaining 30 states had rates that 
were 70 percent too low." Id. at 101. 
42. "Where regulators have intervened to control rates, the result has been the typi-
cal response to price control: a contraction of supply." Id. at 113. Since "(r]egulators 
reflect pressures from their constituents," inadequate rate increases resulted largely from 
the medical profession's opposition to any increases-an opposition hardened by aware-
ness of the medical profession's relatively strong bargaining position. Id. at 102. 
43. 
Even though the immediate crisis seems to have abated, the efforts which were 
made in 1975 and 1976 have barely touched the underlying problems, which 
have to do with aspects of health care delivery and medical discipline, as well as 
the nature of the tort-insurance system itself. 
The need is for a massive and sustained effort to develop ways to deal success-
fully with the underlying problems. Unless this occurs, it is likely that there will 
be frequently recurring medical malpractice crises in the future. 
ABA REPORT, supra note 24, at viii. 
44. See R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 16-17; see also P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 86 
{"Rate increases of 20 and 30 percent a year have been sought since 1982 .... [l)n June 
1983 [insurers' loss ratios] ... exceeded 150 percent."). But see Strasser, supra note 25, 
at 1, col. 3, 40, col. 2 {reporting that with 1986 profits up 625% "the 'insurance crisis' 
... wave now has crested .... Insurance is more available and its cost is increasing 
more slowly."); R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 4 {stating that in spite of increased pre-
mium costs, reports of a new malpractice insurance availability crisis are exaggerated; 
"there is little evidence of widespread availability problems."). 
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urns and its real profits.46 Because of "lag time" or delay be-
tween receipt of premiums and payment of claims, insurance 
companies are able to make substantial investment profits to 
supplement premium income.46 
Insurers anticipate that surpluses during some periods will 
offset losses during others, to provide an adequate and stable 
profit over time. Although periods of unexpectedly high loss ra-
tios will eventually result in higher premiums, receipt of higher 
premiums raises capital reserves, which provides both increased 
investment income and greater ability to withstand high pre-
mium loss ratios. In a competitive insurance market, increases in 
premium investment income allow for premium decreases, which 
continue until losses threaten the premium/capital ratio.47 
The most striking fact about the alleged malpractice crisis is 
that the real, or inflation adjusted, cost of malpractice insurance 
has not increased over time. The malpractice insurance crisis is 
a myth.48 Premium increases from 1973 to 1976 offset relatively 
45. "The unprecedented jump [in insurance prices] last year came because financial 
and market forces had earlier driven prices to unprecedented lows in what is always a 
cyclical industry." Strasser, supra note 25, at 40 (quoting D. Whiteman, Congressional 
Research Serv. economist); see also R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 16. 
46. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 105. 
47. 
The tendency [is] for insurance prices to lag and then lead claim costs and hence 
to produce cycles in underwriting profits .... Since the huge 1975 premium 
increases, malpractice insurance rates have either declined or remained stable 
while the combined loss ratio (claim costs plus all expenses, relative to premium) 
has risen from 94 percent in 1977 to more than 170 percent in 1983. 
P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 103. 
48. The debate over the artificiality of the crisis largely centers on whether or not 
insurers lose money on premiums; or, whether insurers and allied provider groups have 
deceitfully engineered the current crisis atmosphere in order to obtain windfall profits 
from loss-limiting tort reforms, while continuing to increase premiums. See, e.g., Neu-
bauer & Henke, supra note 22, at 64-69. "[T]he medical and insurance industries hood-
winked the legislatures. The malpractice 'crisis' evaporated as quickly as it was manufac-
tured .... " Id. at 65.; see also AMLA Hearings, supra note 22, at 123-25 (statement of 
C. Thomas Bendorf, Executive Director & Director of Public Affairs, Association of Trial 
Lawyers of Am.) (testifying that despite a 25-year underwriting loss of $13.8 billion, in-
surer assets increased from $23 billion to $197 billion; from 1975 to 1982, insurers took in 
premiums totalling $10.62 billion and paid claims worth $2.05 billion, leaving reserves of 
$7.978 billion and earning investment income of $2.755 billion). 
These are specious arguments, as are antithetical insurance industry claims of vast 
losses. Capitalism is characterized by counterbalancing peaks and troughs, which yield a 
steady return of profit over time. Over a period of 25 years, large industries either accu-
mulate substantial assets from profits-or perish. The insurance industry is no excep-
tion. Between 1976 and 1982, a surplus period, premiums actually fell. With interest 
rates and premiums low, but loss ratios at typical highs, premium prices must increase. 
See supra note 44. 
Furthermore, the argument that $35,000 premiums are unjustified with the average 
claim per doctor at only $2300 per year is misleading. AMLA Hearings, supra note 22, at 
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low premiums from 1969 to 1972. The increases since 1983 fol-
low the declining rates of the 1976 to 1982 period."9 Further-
more, provider income growth more than keeps pace with infla-
tionary insurance cost increases. 50 
The major source of the current media and legislative interest 
in the malpractice issue is the "reaction of the [health care] pro-
vider community to [rising] premiums."51 Providers are up in 
arms over the volatility of malpractice insurance rates. 52 The 
crux of the matter, however, is not rate volatility per se, but the 
inefficiency of health care providers as cost spreaders. 
123-24. Given the highly skewed nature of malpractice rates, the small policyholder pools 
involved, and the long tail of future claimants, the low per doctor claim average is 
irrelevant. 
Finally, price-fixing allegations are unfounded; though concentrated, the malpractice 
insurance industry is competitive. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 103. 
49. 
[B]etween 1976 and 1985, malpractice insurance premiums charged by the ma-
jority of insurers did not generally increase in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms. 
In fact, within most specialties, the inflation-adjusted costs of malpractice pre-
miums for most physicians decreased, in some cases substantially . 
. . . For the majority of insurers, the trend in [malpractice) premiums shows 
that between 1976 and 1982, premiums declined by about half in real terms. 
Between 1982 and 1985, premiums increased dramatically, so that, in real terms, 
1985 levels are generally at or slightly below 1976 levels. 
R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 15 (findings 15 & 16). 
50. "For physicians, malpractice insurance premiums average approximately 3 per-
cent of gross income (1982) ranging from 1 percent to 2 percent for general practitioners, 
up to 6 percent for high risk surgical specialties. These percentages have increased only 
slightly since 1970." MICH. INS. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 22, at 1 (emphasis added). 
According to one commentator, physician income growth "has been spectacular. I 
doubt that any other occupational category has ever achieved such a rapid rise in income 
during so short a period of time." Moore, Doctor's Work Ethic, 17 J. Soc. HIST. 547, 560 
(1984). The median net income of nonsalaried physicians has greatly increased since 
World War II: from $8,073 in 1945, to $22,100 in 1959, $41,500 in 1970, and $60,000 in 
1978. Id. at 559. 
In fact, "doctors' fees rise by 9.1 % for every 100 percent increase in premiums when 
these premiums represent only 4 percent of physicians' total operating expenses." MICH. 
INS. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 22, at 6. Normally, one would expect a 100% increase in 
a cost component accounting for 4% of total expenses to increase total expenses by only 
4%. The excess price increase reimburses the provider for the opportunity cost of ad-
vancing the malpractice premium money, though in reality this is simply a misallocation. 
See Zuckerman, Koller & Borbjerg, supra note 20, at 106-07; see also infra notes 63-64 
and accompanying text. 
51. R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 16. 
52. 
Id. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that if these rates had increased gradually and 
incrementally over the past decade, as the claims experience would seem to have 
required, then those providers who have been confronted with the large pre-
mium increases of the recent past would be far less concerned, though not indif-
ferent, to the situation. 
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Premium costs, like all other health care costs, are ultimately 
borne either directly by health care consumers as patients or in-
directly by taxpayers. 63 Furthermore, federal taxpayers subsidize 
employer-financed health insurance benefits64 and fund enor-
mous public health care expenditures, including Medicare55 and 
Medicaid, 56 the federal government's twin programs to subsidize 
health care for the elderly and poor.57 
The problem is that medical fees are "sticky in the short 
run .... [I]nfrequent large premium increases are more costly" 
to providers, particularly physicians, "than an equivalent series 
of small increases," for they are more difficult to recoup.58 When 
a provider is forced to pay a large, immediate premium increase, 
she is forced to dip into her resources until she can pass the full 
extent of the premium increase on to her patients. She loses 
money on that component of her gross costs, which in turn 
reduces her gross profit margin on services rendered. A large, 
abrupt increase in malpractice premiums burdens those provid-
ers suffering cash flow problems. The provider may have diffi-
culty raising large, lump sum payments for malpractice 
insurance. 
Providers feel comparatively little competitive pressure on 
their prices because of both the oligopolistic nature of the health 
53. 
[H]owever risks are allocated, the insurance system passes costs through to pa-
tients and the community at large. Indeed, because of this pass-through of costs, 
it is questionable whether it makes much difference whether physicians are lia-
ble or the loss is left to lie with patients; either way, the public will ultimately 
bear the costs of such risks .... [P]lacement of liability might make a differ-
ence in how (and how well) the risk is administered. 
Robinson, supra note 21, at 182; see also P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 131-32 (noting that 
physicians bear only a small fraction of the costs of malpractice insurance and preven-
tion, and that insurance premiums are tax-deductible). 
54. Under federal tax provisions, employers can deduct the cost of their employee 
health insurance plans, and employees generally can exclude both health insurance bene-
fits and payments received through such benefits (other than those related to absence 
from work) from taxable income. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.105-3, 1.106-1, 1.162-10 (1960). 
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396q (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
57. 
To a large degree, massive governmental and private health insurance funding of 
health care . . . make it feasible for physicians and hospitals to pass cost in-
creases along to patients. In federal year 1975, for example, third party sources 
paid 92% of per capita hospital costs and 64.5% of per capita physicians' costs. 
ABA REPORT, supra note 24, at 72 n.125. 
58. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 103. 
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care industry,119 and the high demand for health care services.60 
This combination of high demand and oligopolistic structure is 
both a blessing and a curse. 
First, prices in an oligopoly are rather inflexible and tend to 
fluctuate incrementally. 61 Second, because the demand for 
59. 
A ... factor upon which analysts of the health-care marketplace have focused 
is the distortion of the normal supply and demand relationship. One distortion 
occurs because consumers are not and cannot be knowledgeable about their ac-
tual medical needs, and must rely upon their physicians as "purchasing agents" 
for health care. The physician, aware that third-party payment is guaranteed 
and that providing additional care to the patient normally results in additional 
income to the provider, has little or no incentive to withhold medically justifia-
ble care .... 
. . . [C]onventional competitive forces do not work freely in the health-care 
market. Physicians have traditionally resisted alternatives to fee-for-service 
practice and shunned colleagues who have worked as employees of corporations 
or of prepaid group practices. Organized medicine has steadfastly opposed ad-
vertising to the public by individual physicians or by groups, and has imposed 
sanctions on errant doctors. Entry to the profession has, of course, been re-
stricted by means of licensing and certification. 
Comment, Reagan Administration Health Legislation: The Emergence of a Hidden 
Agenda, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 575, 578-79 (1983) (footnotes omitted). 
In the oligopolistic health care industry, providers possess "the ability ... to raise 
prices and simultaneously ensure that demand increases enough to support even rapidly 
growing supplies." Roberts & Bogue, The American Health Care System: Where Have 
All the Dollars Gone?, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 635, 651 (1976); see also Comment, supra, at 
578 n.20. 
Patients generally choose providers on the basis of location, specialty, and referrals, 
rather than prices. Many communities harbor few doctors in any particular specialty and 
contain only a small number of hospitals. Because staff privileges typically do not exten-
sively overlap, consumer choice is restricted even further. See Roberts & Bogue, supra, 
at 658-59. 
Reputation supplants price as "a decisive factor governing the demand for [a pro-
vider's] services." Moore, supra, note 50, at 555. This is because "large segments of the 
public want the best possible medical care." Id. at 559. 
In addition, with health insurance so prevalent-"an estimated ninety-five percent of 
Americans currently have some form of health insurance coverage"-health care con-
sumers have little financial incentive to shop around. Comment, supra, at 577-78 (foot-
notes omitted); see also supra note 57. 
60. 
In medical care . . . it may well be the case that, because of third party pay-
ment and consumer attitudes, demand is relatively rather insensitive to prices at 
current average price levels (i.e., an increase in price results in little or no reduc-
tion in the quantity of services demanded by consumers, so that the demand 
curve is almost vertical). 
Roberts & Bogue, supra note 59, at 665 (footnote omitted); see also Moore, supra note 
50, at 560 ("[T]he medical profession provides services-or commodities-for which the 
potential demand is in our culture extraordinarily powerful: escape from death and 
pain."). 
61. According to Professor Calabresi: 
[In an oligopoly,] prices tend to be very "sticky." Each firm knows that if it cuts 
prices in an attempt to increase its share of the market all the others will follow, 
and nothing will have been gained. Similarly, each firm fears that a price rise on 
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health care services is strong and relatively inelastic, providers 
can artificially increase prices without significantly decreasing 
demand for their services.62 As a basic human need, demand for 
health care remains impervious to all but the most substantial 
price increases. Though not vertical, the health care demand 
curve is steep enough to tolerate modest, yet continuous, cost 
increases.63 These steady, incremental increases eventually en-
able providers to completely shift their costs forward to patients; 
the problem is that in the meantime, the provider must bear the 
burden of sudden increases in his own costs, such as increased 
malpractice premiums. 
In sum, providers accept premium decreases without commen-
surate cost decreases, but respond to premium increases not by 
increasing the cost of their services, but by incrementally in-
creasing both demand and prices, not realizing that they are ul-
timately insulated from premium increases. If providers had the 
financial resources to weather periods of sharp premium in-
creases, they would recoup their losses when their real insurance 
costs declined as a result of a favorable economy.64 The current 
its part will not be followed by the other firms, and that this will leave the price-
raiser high and dry . . .. Profits would decline, : . . but no one would leave the 
industry since . . . the oligopoly structure probably guarantees more profits than 
could be made elsewhere. 
Calabresi, supra note 6, at 512 (footnote omitted). 
62. See Roberts & Bogue, supra note 59, at 658-63. Health care costs increase regard-
less of malpractice insurance costs. Because "technical change does not increase produc-
tivity" in the medical industry, providers maintain their relative standards of living by 
artificially inflating costs relative to the rest of the economy, whether by periodically 
raising prices, or by performing unnecessary medical procedures and generally overutiliz-
ing provider resources. Id. at 659. 
· 63. "If demand remains stable, an industry cannot raise its prices without also de-
creasing its sales. The extent of this decrease depends upon the slope of the demand 
curve. If it is relatively steep, changes in price will be accompanied by relatively small 
changes in volume." Morris, supra note 7, at 585. According to Professor Robinson, 
[I]n markets characterized by inadequate information and inadequate competi-
tion, the manufacturer will have some freedom to pass on . . . inefficiently in-
curred costs [in the form of higher prices]. But few commercial markets permit 
the freedom to pass on inefficiently incurred costs to an extent permitted by the 
health care market. Third-party payments for health care costs significantly 
lessen market constraints on health care expenditures. 
Robinson, supra note 21, at 178. 
64. Because of a ratchet effect, providers never lower their prices outright, regardless 
of premium decreases-which are largely due to premium investment income during 
profitable economic conditions. Instead, they wait until inflation has narrowed the gap 
between what was charged and what should have been charged, relative to the decrease 
in the insurance component of their overall costs. In the meantime, providers essentially 
enjoy windfall profits. With a sudden premium cost increase, however, the providers suf-
fer a decrease in profits, since fee rates are "sticky" and can only be increased gradually. 
Providers then publicly complain, not realizing that this trough is the natural corollary 
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malpractice insurance uproar is thus a function of (1) shallow 
provider financial resources; (2) the requirement of incremental 
price increases; (3) distorted provider perception of the overall 
favorable situation, in the face of periodic hardship; and ( 4) 
overly optimistic provider expectations resulting from periods of 
relative prosperity. 
C. The Litigation Problem 
Few, if any, would retain the current liability system without 
modification. Although actually maintaining their real income 
levels over time, doctors complain of insurance cost increases, as 
well as of the frustration, hardship, and extra medical costs en-
gendered by tort litigation. Similarly, insurance companies com-
plain of falling profits and rising loss ratios611 in a bid to obtain 
rate increases from state regulators. 66 
Plaintiffs' attorneys bemoan the unpredictability of outcomes, 
the risk to firm capital tied up in litigation expenses, and the 
paucity of prompt settlements. 67 Defense attorneys complain of 
the unpredictability of "emotional" juries, and generally adopt 
the views of their insurer clients. 68 
Of course, those who really bear the brunt of the tort system's 
costs are those who lack an organized lobby to push and publi-
cize their interests-health care consumers.69 They face a system 
to the earlier peak. Eventually, providers recoup even more than their temporary losses, 
and the cycle repeats. 
65. See supra note 48. 
66. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
67. See generally L. CHARFOOS, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE (1977) (most plain-
tiffs' attorneys are selective and reluctant to accept malpractice cases absent clear liabil-
ity and serious injury). 
68. See, e.g., AMLA Hearings, supra note 22, at 110, 111 (statement of Joseph Metz-
ger, Esq.). 
69. The system is particularly biased against the poor and elderly. They can least 
afford high-quality medical care but are most likely to need it. Abel, supra note 8, at 717; 
Abel, £'s of Cure, Ounces of Prevention (Book Review), 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1003, 1006-07 
(1985) [hereinafter Abel, Review] (reviewing D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-
BosTICK, P. FENN, P. CORFIELD & Y. BRITTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS 
AND INJURY (1984)). Inability to afford adequate health care leaves the poor more suscep-
tible to malpractice injuries; and, because the poor lack sufficient financial resources, 
such injuries are more difficult for them to absorb without ample compensation. Yet poor 
and elderly malpractice victims are much less likely to bring claims. Abel, Review, supra, 
at 1006; cf. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 74 (although more susceptible to injury, elderly 
are less likely to sue, primarily because they receive smaller awards). 
The poor plaintiff finds the law of malpractice biased against him precisely because of 
the poverty that forced him or her to obtain substandard medical care in the first place. 
In determining the standard of care to apply to a defendant, "courts have considered 
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that is unbearably slow and capricious in compensating victims, 
and does little to control risks. Although both ~ides must endure 
the pain of prolonged litigation and uncertain outcomes, the 
plaintiff is frequently in desperate financial, emotional, and 
physical condition. He or she may suffer through years of stress-
ful litigation, only to lose at trial.70 
The evils of tort litigation-particularly medical malpractice 
tort litigation-are well-documented. Key problems cited by 
critics include the delay71 and expense72 of resolving claims. Fur-
thermore, the tort system has been characterized as a lottery be-
cause of its unpredictability and tendency to award dispropor-
tionate compensation to similarly situated plaintiffs.73 
The present situation is as distressing to health care providers 
as it is to most consumers. At least one in four physicians will be 
sued for malpractice each year; litigation is even more likely for 
socio-economic factors such as population, type of economy, size of city, and income of 
inhabitants." Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 196 n.5, 349 
A.2d 245, 250 n.5 (1975) (emphasis added); accord Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977). 
70. A Michigan study found that only 45% of all claims filed result in indemnity 
payments, and that this percentage has remained stable for at least a decade. R. Flem-
ing, supra note 31, at 14. In the rare case that goes to trial, plaintiffs are successful only 
27% of the time, and only about 12% receive an award above $50,000. Yet only 5% of all 
claims filed in court actually resulted in a formal trial. MICH. lNs. BUREAU REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 11. 
71. For example, in Michigan, from 1976 to 1984, "fewer than 20% of claims were 
closed within two years of filing and only 55% were closed within four years of filing." R. 
Fleming, supra note 31, at 15. 
72. According to various estimates, 16% of the premium paid is spent on the legal 
cost of defending claims, while 44% is paid out in claims. Additionally, 34.5% is spent 
on production costs and company expenses, and 5% goes for underwritng profit and 
contingencies. Of the claims paid, from one-third to as much as one-half goes to the 
plaintiff's attorney, leaving the patient with 22% to 30% of the premium dollar. See, 
e.g., Federal Medical Malpractice Insurance Act, 1975: Hearings on S. 482, S. 215, and 
S. 188 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 453 (1975) [hereinafter FMMIA Hearings] (testimony of Rich-
ard Lino, Vice Pres., Insurance Serv. Office); see also O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Reme-
dies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 125, 127 (claiming that 28 cents of each insurance pre-
mium dollar was returned to injured patients, of which "only 12.5 cents reimburse the 
victim for economic losses not already compensated by other sources"). 
In addition, judicial administration of tort litigation is extremely costly: "[T]he public 
cost of operating the judicial system . . . has been estimated at . . . about $300 million 
... for tort claims." Abel, Review, supra note 69, at 1019 n.52. 
73. "The inherent difficulty of proving fault leads to huge transaction costs. . . . The 
result is that many accident victims are left either totally or relatively unpaid for their 
losses, while others in similar or identical circumstances are awarded far more than their 
actual losses." O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract In Lieu of Tort: Preaccident 
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 899 (1985). 
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doctors practicing a high-risk specialty.74 Both the threat and 
actuality of litigation cause severe physician "psychic wear and 
tear."n Fear of potential litigation has caused many physicians 
"to stop seeing certain types of patients, think of retiring early, 
and discourage their children from entering medicine. "76 
Commentators have recognized the central importance of en-
suring that the doctor-patient relationship remain nonadver-
sarial. 77 To the extent that the omnipresent threat of malprac-
tice claims encourages the trend towards a less open, more 
impersonal doctor-patient relationship, both patient and pro-
vider suffer.78 The patient becomes just another commodity to 
be processed, while the provider, who entered the often demand-
ing medical profession with high ideals and normative expecta-
tions, 79 becomes a technician, or, even worse, an anonymous 
though well-paid worker on the health care assembly line.80 
Malpractice litigation may reduce "physicians' freedom to ex-
ercise their own clinical judgment," depriving patients of "the 
full range of a physician's professional expertise."81 The threat 
74. Charles, Wilbert & Franke, Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported Reac-
tions to Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437 (1985). 
75. Charles, Wilbert & Franke, supra note 74, at 437 ("Although both sued and non-
sued physicians reported changes in professional behavior and emotional reactions to 
both the threat and actuality of litigation, sued physicians reported significantly more 
symptoms [of stress or affective disorder) than nonsued physicians."); O'Connell, supra 
note 72, at 126 (quoting BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, STUDY OF PRO-
FESSIONAL LIABILITY CosTs 101 (1983)). "'[T]he biggest cost' of suits brought under the 
malpractice system is 'the emotional injury that a physician experiences when he or she 
believes that he or she has done the best possible under difficult circumstances. De-
creases in physician productivity as a result of such dysfunction cannot be estimated.' " 
But see Peters, Nord & Woodson, An Empirical Analysis of the Medical and Legal 
Professions' Experiences and Perceptions of Medical and Legal Malpractice, 19 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 601, 622 (1986) ("[T]he effects of an actual suit seem less than the feared 
effects anticipated by the unsued."). 
76. Charles, Wilbert & Franke, supra note 74, at 437. Such responses to litigation 
may have an adverse effect on health care availability. Id. at 440; Peters, Nord & Wood-
son, supra note 75, at 616-20. 
77. R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 7. 
78. "[M)alpractice litigation ... and the resultant stress on both sued and nonsued 
physicians may ... diminish rather than enhance the integrity and availability of medi-
cal care." Charles, Wilbert & Franke, supra note 74, at 440. 
79. Traditionally, physicians held high professional ideals of service and self-sacrifice. 
See Moore, supra note 50. 
80. See Sugarman, supra note 5, at 584-85. 
Id. 
[A]nother consequence of plaintiff's right to sue in tort is that defendants often 
perceive litigation as unjustified .... [P]rofessionals become demoralized by 
participation in discovery and trial as well as by unfavorable outcomes. 
. . . [M]alpractice law seems to have made cynics out of many doctors and has 
probably hurt doctor-patient trust relationships. 
81. Charles, Wilbert & Franke, supra note 74, at 440. 
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of litigation may also discourage providers from admitting mis-
takes, thus allowing malpractice to go undetected where the pa-
tient is unaware.82 Finally, litigation induces providers to prac-
tice inefficient "defensive medicine," that is, superfluous tests 
and procedures performed in order to foreclose potential tort li-
ability.83 Although the extent of defensive medicine is difficult to 
gauge, its cost is probably significant.84 
Defenders of the fault-based tort system point to the deter-
rent and quality assurance effects of litigation. One such sup-
porter declared: "What is needed is more fault, not no-fault."8~ 
The evidence seems to suggest, however, that although medical 
malpractice tort liability unquestionably generates some socially 
undesirable costs, it accomplishes little deterrence. 86 For one 
thing, strong nonlegal incentives to avoid injuring people exist, 
including the code of medical ethics and the provider's prof es-
sional reputation.87 Moreover, the relative infrequency of claims 
and the unpredictability of awards undercut the deterrent value 
of the possibility of a malpractice action. 88 
82. See R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 10. 
· 83. "These practices are said to occur when specific diagnostic and treatment mea-
sures are employed explicitly for the purposes either of averting a possible law suit or of 
providing appropriate documentation that a wide range of tests and treatments has been 
used in the patient's care." Tancredi & Barondess, supra note 20, at 879. 
84. Unfortunately, accuracy is limited by the "statistical and definitional difficulties" 
of studying litigation-related defensive medicine. Id. at 881; Robinson, supra note 21, at 
177. A 1984 study by the American Medical Association (AMA) estimated that defensive 
medicine increases the national health care bill by 10% each year, or an estimated $15.1 
billion annually. See MICH. INS. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 22, at 12. That vast amount 
is probably greater than any deterrence the current system accomplishes. Some 1975 
estimates ranged from $3 billion to $7 billion. Tancredi & Barondess, supra note 20, at 
879. Others have disagreed, arguing that the effects of defensive medicine "are probably 
small relative to both the cost and the quality of patient care." Id. 
85. FMMIA Hearings, supra note 72, at 675 (statement of Sydney Wolfe, M.D., Pub-
lic Citizen's Health Research Group). 
86. "[T]he assumption that negligence is effectively prevented by fear of legal liabil-
ity and assessment of tort damages has been subject to cogent challenge." O'Connell, 
supra note 72, at 139. 
87. Robinson, supra note 21, at 176-77; see also Moore, supra note 50, at 554. That a 
physician in the midst of an operation or course of treatment consciously wonders 
whether he might be subject to malpractice litigation in the event something goes wrong 
is difficult to believe. Although the physician may be concerned or upset about the threat 
of malpractice litigation in general, see Charles, Wilbert & Franke, supra note 74, it 
seems more credible that in a core operation or treatment, the physician simply tries his 
best and uses his normal judgment, however substandard that might be in any individual 
case. The threat of litigation may well induce the window dressing of defensive medicine, 
but core operation or treatment decisions are made and actions are taken with little or 
no regard to potential malpractice litigation. 
88. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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Even in the event of an adverse judgment, almost all providers 
are insulated by liability insurance, a situation known as "moral 
hazard."89 The medical malpractice insurance rating structure is 
extremely rigid, with little selective underwriting. Very little rat-
ing is based on individualized evaluation or past claims experi-
ence,90 probably because "the small pool of policyholders and 
the instability of loss experience over time preclude drawing 
finer classifications with actuarial credibility."91 Although the 
threat of medical malpractice litigation accomplishes some de-
terrence, such deterrence may result from the regulatory re-
sponse, not the tort system itself.92 A system of first party MMI 
would generate comparable deterrence by retaining regulatory 
supervision. When its associated costs are taken into account, 
malpractice litigation generates insufficient deterrence to uphold 
it over first party MMl.93 
89. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 91. 
90. Id. at 94. 
91. Id. at 95. Identifying an insured provider with negligence is damaging to the in-
sured's professional reputation. To rate insureds on the basis of claims experience is 
unfair when the system is fault based because too few claims go all the way to verdict. 
Some claims lack any merit at all, while others, although settled, would probably win at 
trial. Less than 10% of all malpractice claims go to verdict; only 2% are successful. Id. at 
31, 39. Yet many grievously injured persons never even initiate a claim, and, although 
valid, many claims go uncompensated. See supra notes 36 and 70. 
To rate insureds fairly under the present system, either all maloccurrences would have 
to be taken into account, or only those few that go to an award verdict. Providers would 
strongly resist the former, while the latter is of little statistical use to insurers. 
Under MMI, however, by determining the number of paid maloccurrence claims, an 
insurer could fairly rate providers for the benefit of its policyholders. See infra note 172. 
The provider's professional reputation is not at stake, since fault is not a criterion; fur-
thermore, the first party insurer has no duty to the provider, who is not a party to the 
insurance contract. 
92. Insurance companies and government regulations have required hospitals to insti-
tute review boards to periodically review staff performance, hospital grievance proce-
dures for patients, and other quality control measures. See, e.g., Act approved July 2, 
1985, ch. 294, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 686. The most notable regulatory development has 
been the advent of the Peer Review Org~nizations (PRO's). 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1982). 
See Note, The Medicare Rx: Prospective Pricing to Effect Cost Containment, 19 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 743, 759-60 (1986). 
Such measures streamline hospital administration and enhance risk management "re-
porting, investigation, analysis, and recommendations concerning 'incidents' which have 
potential liability exposure for the hospital or personnel. The activity is dedicated to 
examining and correcting or eliminating behaviors and procedures which give rise to 
such incidents." Id. at 764 n.108. Nevertheless, such regulations are responses to the 
inadequacy of tort liability deterrence, not a demonstration of its effectiveness. See Abel, 
supra note 8, at 697-99. 
There is no question that doctors abhor being sued and are willing to take significant 
steps-not always in the public interest-to avert malpractice litigation. Avoiding mal-
practice litigation, however, must not be confused with avoiding malpractice. 
93. Danzon estimates that the current malpractice liability system must reduce the 
number of negligent injuries by 20% if it is to be worth retaining in spite of its costs, 
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III. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
Numerous solutions to the malpractice problem have been 
suggested, ranging from extreme transformation to slight adjust-
ment of the current system. The proposals fall under the sub-
headings of tort reform, neo-no-fault, comprehensive national 
regulation, third party no-fault, and Designated Compensable 
Events insurance. 
A. Tort Reforms · 
Numerous tort reform measures have been suggested in re-
sponse to dissatisfaction with current medical malpractice litiga-
tion. Although some of these reforms have been adopted by vari-
ous states,94 they have been challenged in state courts as 
unconstitutional, "with varying degrees of success."05 Adopted 
modifications include "caps" or ceilings on the malpractice vic-
tim's noneconomic damage award, structuring damage award 
payments over a period of years, tightening the statute of limita-
tions for filing malpractice claims, malpractice claim screening 
panels, elimination of the "collateral source rule" and "ad 
damnum" clauses in pleadings, abolition of the doctrine of the 
joint and several liability of tortfeasors, and restrictions on at-
torneys' contingent fees.96 
Because these measures are largely a legislative response to 
the insurance and provider lobbies, not surprisingly, they usu-
ally come at the expense of malpractice victims. These and other 
measures are regressive in that they seek to make malpractice 
"rather than simply compensating victims through first party insurance and foregoing all 
aim at deterrence." P. DANZ0N, supra note 1, at 226. Danzon acknowledges that "a full 
cost-benefit evaluation is impossible because we cannot measure the number of injuries 
that are prevented as a result of the additional care exercised by medical providers in 
response to the threat of liability," id. at 225-26, but simply assumes that the current 
system is worth retaining. This Note argues otherwise. As one commentator noted, 
"[T]oday's insured malpractice system provides precious little deterrence .... " Moore 
& Hoff, H.R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation System for Medical Malpractice, 
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 117, 122. 
94. See, e.g., California Medical Injury Compensation Act, ch. 1, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 
2d Ex. Sess. 3949; Medical Malpractice-Comprehensive Reform, 1985 N.Y. Laws 294; 
Civil Procedure-Venue, Costs and Fees, Medical Malpractice and Personal Injury Ac-
tions, 1986 Mich. Pub. Acts 178. 
95. Neubauer & Henke, supra note 22, at 64-65. 
96. Zuckerman, Koller & Borbjerg, supra note 20, at 101-03; R. Fleming, supra note 
31, at 18-26. Comprehensive discussions of various tort reforms can also be found in 
ABA REPORT, supra note 24, and P. DANZON, supra note 1. See also supra note 25. 
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claims more difficult and less remunerative, regardless of the 
merit of the claim and severity of the injury. Yet, for all these 
"deprivations of common law rights and remedies otherwise en-
joyed by tort victims,"97 most commentators agree that such 
modifications, even if constitutional, "will have, at most, a minor 
impact on insurance premium costs. "98 
These tort reforms are simply stop gap measures, individually 
of relatively little significance, but thought to restrain synergisti-
cally the growth of malpractice insurance claim costs. Apart 
from their unfairness, however, the extent of their restraint is 
debatable. Both health care costs in general99 and claim losses in 
particular continue to outpace inflation.100 
Nevertheless, tort reform legislation is widely credited with 
abating the 1975 malpractice crisis.101 Now that the same 
problems of insurance cost and availability have apparently re-
turned, a new wave of tort reform has inundated state legisla-
tures. Thus far, however, the legislatures have failed to recognize 
the nature of the problem. Like the earlier reforms, these incre-
mental responses fail to address the malpractice problem sys-
tematically, and will probably have little comprehensive impact 
on the problem. 
The malpractice problem has two main components: the in-
surance problem and the litigation problem. The insurance 
problem stems from the inadequacy of provider spreading of 
volatile premium costs, not the increase in claim costs. Volatility 
is a result of the subordination of the insurance industry to the 
business cycle,102 while the inadequacy of provider cost spread-
ing is a structural feature of the health care industry.103 Neither 
incremental tort reform nor increased regulation of the insur-
ance and health care industries will significantly affect either as-
pect of the insurance problem. 
The litigation problem involves two basic concerns: "proce-
dural deficiencies" and "secondary costs."10" Again, incremental 
97. Neubauer & Henke, supra note 22, at 64. 
98. ABA REPORT, supra note 24, at vii. According to Natwar M. Gandhi, Chief Econ-
omist for the General Accounting Office, "[T]here is no connection between tort reform 
and rate reduction." Strasser, supra note 25, at 40. 
99. See, e.g., Neubauer & Henke, supra note 22, at 67. 
100. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 225. 
101. See, e.g., MICH. INS. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 22, at 4. 
102. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
104. The term "procedural deficiencies" refers to the difficulty, delay, expense, un-
predictability, and disproportionate compensation typical of such litigation. See supra 
notes 70-73 and accompanying text. "Secondary costs" means those problems associated 
with malpractice litigation in general, and not directly arising out of any one claim in 
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tort reform will have little impact upon the resolution of these 
concerns. Only a significant net reduction in the volume of mal-
practice litigation and some type of prospective award predict-
ability would ameliorate the situation.105 
B. "Neo-No-Fault" Proposals 
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has written extensively in support 
of his "neo-no-fault" proposal, which Congressmen W. Henson 
Moore and Richard Gephardt have attempted to get the House 
to enact for several years.106 The O'Connell proposal appears in 
two forms, one contractual and the other statutory. Both neo-
no-fault versions have serious flaws, including the elimination of 
noneconomic damages, and the preservation of the fault-based, 
adversarial relationship between provider and patient.107 
particular. Such problems include: doctor-patient adversity; the psychic wear and tear of 
the threat or actuality of litigation; defensive medicine; restriction of the availability of 
care for certain patients and of the physician's freedom of judgment; victim ignorance of 
unrealized claims; and the overall government expense of providing a judicial forum for 
resolution of malpractice claims. See supra notes 36, 72, 7 4-84 and accompanying text. 
105. _ Only a significant net reduction in the overall volume of malpractice litigation 
would reduce the basic problem of secondary costs as well as the procedural problem of 
delay. Tightening the statute of limitations will achieve insignificant reductions, since 
the vast majority of claims are filed or become apparent within two to three years of the 
injury. ABA REPORT, supra note 24, at 63 n.95. 
Ceilings on recoveries reduce overall claim costs slightly, though few awards exceed the 
high ceilings established. See id. at 66. But see P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 48 (ceilings 
decrease average settlement by 25%). Because both doctor and hospital are almost al-
ways separately and fully insured, however, increasing claim costs are not the problem 
per se. For the same reason, abrogation of the doctrine of joint and several liability 
should have negligible effects as well. As a restriction on a completely separate, private 
contract, application of the collateral source rule to subtract first party health insurance 
payments from the malpractice award is unfair, arguably unconstitutional, see Neubauer 
& Henke, supra note 22, at 64, and does not affect the central issue of noneconomic 
damages. But see P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 170 (estimating that complete collateral 
source offset would reduce claim costs by 30-40% ). Although slightly reducing settlement 
size and litigation volume, restricting attorney fees unduly restricts victim access to legal 
representation. Id. at 42-43, 196-97. Such measures probably do little to enhance the 
uniformity of awards or decrease secondary costs. 
106. Originally introduced as H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) and later reintro-
duced as H.R. 3084, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
Danzon's elective concept is similar to the "neo-no-fault" proposal. See P. DANZON, 
supra note 1, at 208-19. 
107. According to the sponsor of the statutory version, "[t]he bill is not a no-fault 
proposal. To the contrary, it retains the central principle of tort law that compensation 
should be based on faulty behavior, and it would not provide compensation for all bad 
outcomes occurring in the course of health care." Moore & Hoff, supra note 93, at 117-
18. 
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Under the terms of the Moore-Gephardt bill, the provider 
may foreclose civil action stemming from an adverse medical 
outcome by pledging to pay the patient compensation benefits 
equal to the net economic loss resulting from such injury, plus 
attorney's fees, within 180 days of the action or inaction giving 
rise to the personal injury.108 Payment would be made as the 
victim incurred economic losses. 
Where the provider has no reason to know that a negligent 
injury has occurred, actual receipt of a claim would trigger the 
time period.1°9 As actually practiced, however, the providers 
would almost always wait for the claim itself, knowing that it 
frequently would not arise at all and that, if it did, the provider 
could claim that the injury was not negligent. 
The insurer will make an offer when the plaintiff has a clear-
cut case with heavy exposure-potentially high damages-in or-
der to prevent recovery in excess of economic losses. In the mar-
ginal cases, however, such offers will not be forthcoming because 
fault is retained as a criterion for award: if the case is clearly 
defensible, the insurer retains the option to claim that the likely 
recovery, as discounted by the probability of success, is zero and 
refuse to tender an offer. 
O'Connell's contractual version is meaningless as well. Under 
the contractual version, the provider and his insurer would agree 
"to make postaccident tenders of net economic loss upon the oc-
currence of a defined event."110 The victim would be free to re-
ject the offer and sue in tort. The problem with the contractual 
proposal is the inverse of that of the statutory proposal: "Be-
cause injured patients retain the option to accept or reject pay-
ment of net economic loss ... those with promising tort claims 
would opt to sue while only those with a poor prospect for a 
larger recovery would accept the tender."m 
At present, however, the provider/insurer can already tender 
economic damages right at the outset if it so chooses. The ad-
vantage of neo-no-fault, according to O'Connell, is that the set-
The contractual proposal is similar, except that the victim retains the option of re-
jecting the settlement offer and suing; the contract would be between the insurer and the 
provider. O'ConnelJ, supra note 72, at 131-37. 
108. H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1984); see also Moore & Hoff, supra note 
93, at 117-18. 
109. Moore & Hoff, supra note 93, at 119. 
110. O'ConnelJ, supra note 72, at 132. O'ConneIJ believes that most malpractice vic-
tims with good claims would accept the prompt offer of net economic losses. O'ConneIJ's 
belief is probably naive, given that many patients already have colJateral protection 
against much of the economic loss and primarily seek damages for pain and suffering. 
111. Id. 
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tlement off er is less discretionary under either the contractually 
elected or statutorily mandated versions of his neo-no-fault pro-
posal; therefore, insurers will no longer hesitate to tender net 
economic loss out of fear that the off er will provide the plaintiff 
with a tactical advantage. 112 
O'Connell offers no evidence in support of this rather implau-
sible assertion. If there is a reasonable possibility of recovery, 
plaintiffs' lawyers generally expect an offer of at least net eco-
nomic loss.113 Under the current system, the rational insurer 
makes a maximum offer equal to the anticipated cost of legal 
defense plus the probability-discounted value of the award. The 
Moore-Gephardt neo-no-fault bill artificially caps the maximum 
off er at the amount of net economic losses, regardless of insurer 
loss exposure on the claim. 114 Where the bulk of the economic 
loss is already covered by collateral insurance sources-probably 
the majority of cases-victims of provider negligence would re-
ceive minimal allotments. 
O'Connell's proposal to combine the contractual version with 
the statutory approach makes little sense. Neither the contrac-
tual approach, which gives claimants the discretion to accept the 
insurer's prearranged offer, nor the statutory approach, which 
gives insurers the discretion to offer while denying claimants the 
right to refuse, is fair or sensible, but in combination they cancel 
112. O'Connell argues that under neo-no-fault, "an insurer need not fear that the 
offer to cover net economic loss will be perceived simply as an opening bid or as a signal 
of weakness, encouraging plaintiffs ... to hold out for more." Id. 
113. Neither special legislation nor preaccident guarantees of tenders are needed for 
insurers to make settlement offers without appearing weak. The insurer need only pub-
licly endorse the neo-no-fault formula of readily tendering economic damages. 
The only information an offer of net economic damages can possibly provide to the 
plaintiff's attorney-who is more concerned with pain and suffering-is that the com-
pany feels the case has a reasonable possibility of success. The plaintiff's attorney al-
ready knows that-otherwise he would have declined to take the case or dropped it. See 
P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 42-45 (half of all claims dropped without payment, usually 
because plaintiff's stakes are low relative to costs). 
114. 
A decision to tender net economic loss will be made whenever the lump sum that 
the insurer must set aside to pay them is Jess than the sum of (1) the anticipated 
costs of a defense and (2) the likely recovery (appropriately discounted for the 
possibility that a cl!lim will not succeed). 
O'Connell, supra note 72, at 130. 
A rational offer under the current system is usually much higher than the simple offer 
of economic damages, which may be lower than the insurer's own anticipated litigation 
costs. At present, the possibility of noneconomic damage awards raises the maximum 
settlement offer well above the plaintiff's net economic loss. 
Under the Moore-Gephardt bill, the maximum offer or "lump sum" is "capped" at the 
amount of net economic damages. If the claim is worth defending, no offer will be made, 
but if the calculated "lump sum" is greater than the net economic loss-if the insurer is 
heavily exposed on the claim-he will tender an offer to foreclose adequate recovery. 
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each other out. Combining the two approaches would result in 
pure third party no-fault, which O'Connell and most providers 
and insurers strongly wish to avoid. Furthermore, as O'Connell 
himself recognizes, no provider would bind himself by a preac-
cident commitment if he could have the best of all worlds 
through a statute. m O'Connell never adequately explains how 
such a hybrid system might work, except to state briefly that it 
would result in fairer subrogation between providers-an issue 
that is entirely beside the point. 
Statutory neo-no-fault is nothing more than a Trojan horse, 
bearing the total elimination of noneconomic damages in what 
appears to be the pleasing countenance of no-fault; a closer look 
reveals a third-party, fault-based tort system. The statutory ver-
sion gives absolutely nothing to the victim that he does not al-
ready have, while severely limiting his recovery. There is no quid 
pro quo here. 116 The plan's backers claim that it would increase 
the frequency of early payments by limiting their magnitude. 
Regardless of arguably more prompt and frequent payment, and 
lower litigation costs, the plan ultimately would reduce overall 
claim losses by severely restricting the amount recoverable. This 
would greatly benefit liability insurers at the expense of mal-
practice victims. 
Mindful that an outright cap on noneconomic damages might 
be either politically or constitutionally unacceptable, 117 insurers 
lend their support to neo-no-fault-the effective equivalent of a 
cap. Neo-no-fault supporters claim the proposal is fair, in that 
the victims are receiving a valuable quid pro quo. Yet the reality 
is that any consideration of statutory neo-no-fault offers given to 
victims in exchange for surrendering their rights to sue for pain 
and suffering, is either illusory or trivial. Under the present sys-
tem, bona fide plaintiffs expect insurers to make rational settle-
ment offers; neo-no-fault would artificially reduce the maximum 
settlement offer to the paltry upper limit of net economic loss. A 
fortiori, the contractual approach is meaningless; no insurance 
company would voluntarily agree in advance to waive its right to 
defend a defensible suit, when it can do so on an ad hoc basis. 
Any system of tort compensation should sufficiently compen-
sate victims for pain and suffering. In the first place, such inju-
ries are very real. Compensation makes the person whole, restor-
115. Id. at 138. 
116. The lack of a genuine quid pro quo indicates the dubious constitutionality of 
neo-no-fault. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
117. See Neubauer & Henke, supra note 22, at 64-65. 
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ing some of the comfort that has been stripped from the victim's 
life, and aiding the victim's reintegration into society.118 
Furthermore, the emphasis on economic damages places a pre-
mium on wage loss, severely reducing recovery by members of 
the low income class. By taking the income loss of a victim as a 
measure of the victim's worth, neo-no-fault reinforces society's 
"differential valuations."119 
Giving the defendant the choice of whether or not to make the 
offer, while stripping the victim of the right to reject it, is clearly 
unfair. Responding to this apparent asymmetry, O'Connell 
harshly notes that "injured patients whose net economic losses 
are paid are being treated very well in comparison with most 
victims of misfortune in our society, whether from illness, injury, 
handicap, crime, unemployment, or other mishap."120 
Obviously, however, the fact that malpractice victims are bet-
ter off then those unfortunates that society has chosen to ignore 
does not address the more relevant question, whether malprac-
tice victims have been adequately compensated. 121 Under the 
neo-no-fault proposal, the answer would be negative. 
C. Broad National Injury Compensation Programs 
The present American tort system favors those victims who 
can trace their injuries to the fault of another over those who 
118. 
The victims of bad fortune face severe systemic and personal obstacles to a full 
integration into communal life. The victim's agony is not merely the physical 
pain, but the frightening realization that she has been destroyed as a person. 
Accident victims' self-esteem and confidence in the community 'become as ashes 
in [their] mouth[s].' 
Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 763. 
119. Abel, supra note 8, at 716. 
Eliminating recovery for pain and suffering would prejudice the rights of the poor or 
retired, leaving them "with a clear message that they do not have intrinsic worth since 
they do not have earnings to be replaced by damages.'' AMLA Hearings, supra note 22, 
at 101 (statement of Patricia Nemore, Staff Attorney, National Senior Citizens Center). 
Eliminating noneconomic damages would provide the lowest compensation to 
those-the poor-who typically experience the greatest risk. See Abel, supra note 8, at 
717. 
120. O'Connell, supra note 72, at 129-30. 
121. Latin raises the issue of "distributional fairness": "[I)t is not immediately ap-
parent why tort victims should be precluded from obtaining full redress from responsible 
human agents just because society chooses not to provide complete compensation for 
other categories of victims.'' Latin, supra note 9, at 742. 
To the extent that it is unfair that others who have suffered have had to bear the 
burden alone, the remedy is to enact broad national health insurance plans. Neo-no-
fault, on the other hand, would leave victims largely to their own devices. 
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can trace their injuries to another, but cannot prove fault. These 
two classes of victims are favored over "the victims of illnesses 
or other accidents, ranging from accidents caused by fires or an 
explosion to a mere slip in the bath-tub."122 Yet such differential 
treatment of equally serious injuries is not self-evidently 
justifiable.123 
In fact, various commentators12• and a number of countries 
have decided that because every member of the community has 
a right to well-being, the burden of injuries should be distrib-
uted throughout the community, regardless of causation and 
negligence. Those who believe that society ought to compensate 
the victims of all misfortunes advocate a general accident insur-
ance/compensation fund. 1211 Numerous countries126 have adopted 
general accident compensation plans of various design, although 
none have gone so far as to compensate mere misfortune, prefer-
ring in such instances to rely upon general social security or 
health insurance mechanisms. 127 
Comprehensive compensation plans replace tort damages with 
assured compensation of varying degrees, without regard to type 
of accident or fault. They may be administered as part of a so-
cial security program, a national health insurance program, or 
out of a specific insurance fund to compensate personal inju-
ries. 128 The government may directly administer the fund, or it 
122. Tune, Traffic Accident Compensation: Law and Proposals 51, in 11 INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 14.92 (A. Tune ed. 1971). 
123. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 5, at 593 ("[T]ort law bars compensation to 
victims who, from the perspective of their need, are as deserving as those who succeed 
through the system."). 
124. See, e.g., id.; Hutchinson, supra note 8, at 757-60 (advocating compensation for 
"bad fortune" under a general right to well-being). 
125. Tune, supra note 122, at 51; see also Sugarman, supra note 5, at 592-93. 
126. Great Britain, Australia, Sweden, and New Zealand, among others, have some 
type of comprehensive compensation system. New Zealand is a particularly interesting 
example, for several reasons. First, it has a common law background. Second, "the sys-
tem comprehensively covers all personal injury caused by accident," including medical 
malpractice, and "has completely replaced the common law action for personal injury 
caused by accident." Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Expe-
rience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976, 979 (1985). 
A government corporation provides benefits to victims, including "virtually all medi-
cal, rehabilitation and funeral expenses, plus income replacement equal to eighty percent 
of the income actually lost," as well as a small stipend for noneconomic compensation. 
The system is largely funded from levies on employers and the self-employed, as well as 
from automobile registration and licensing fees, thereby generating considerable "exter-
nalities," or disincentives to deterrence. Id. at 983. 
127. Considerable literature on these plans exists. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 5; 
Fleming, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 126. For the purposes of this Note, noting the 
significance of this approach is sufficient. 
128. See sources cited supra note 127. 
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may regulate the activities of private insurance companies that 
provide the actual coverage. 
On the whole, these systems have worked well, compensating 
more victims without straining resources and revenues, and 
without any indication of adverse effects on risk control.120 
These comprehensive accident compensation programs are ac-
companied by generous social security/health insurance provi-
sions in order to reduce both the "liability gap" between com-
pensable and noncompensable mJuries, and the related 
"boundary problem" of distinguishing compensable from non-
compensable injuries. 130 These accompanying provisions provide 
benefits to those whose injuries are not covered as accidents, 
such as victims of illness. J! 
A national no-fault program tailored specifically to medical 
malpractice may be possible apart from a broad, general welfare 
proposal, or in conjunction with one.131 During the 1970's, pro-
posals for both broad welfare system expansion, 132 government 
sponsored malpractice insurance, and medical malpractice no-
fault compensation received ser10us consideration in this 
country. 133 
Replacement of the tort system with a no-fault compensation 
plan is not without a substantial precedent in this country: 
workers' compensation. Workers who are injured on the job re-
ceive workers' compensation benefits according to specified pay 
129. See sources cited supra note 127. 
130. Sugarman, supra note 5, at 628-35. 
131. 
In Sweden, where there is in place a Patient No-Fault Insurance plan, the plan 
does not compensate for all medical injuries but for those that are unexpected 
for the patient, and unforeseeable or improbable in the judgement of the attend-
ing physician. Where an injury is a predictable result or risk of a medical en-
counter, e.g., the consequence of necessary treatment, it is not compensated. Mi-
nor injuries are excluded. If the injury could have been prevented, indemnity is 
provided. 
R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 30 (footnote omitted). 
132. Such proposals called for expansion of the social welfare system along European 
lines. A central government agency would oversee the payment of health care costs, 
which would be financed through employment related and general tax revenues. See, e.g., 
H.R. 13870 and S. 3286, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Comprehensive National Health 
Insurance Act of 1974). 
133. The main effort under this approach to medical malpractice was the proposed 
federal medical malpractice insurance legislation, which was offered in conjunction with 
a comprehensive program of medical injury compensation. See supra note 26. S. 482 
would have put the government in the·business of underwriting malpractice insurance. S. 
215 would have offered providers the opportunity to participate in an elective no-fault 
insurance scheme, offering victims of health care maloccurrence the option of either su-
ing in tort or accepting specified no-fault benefits, including up to $2000 per month for 
noneconomic damages. 
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schedules, without regard to fault. Limited first party no-fault 
insurance for automobile accidents has also been widely 
adopted. 134 Yet despite the widespread support for workers' 
compensation and no-fault auto insurance, there is great resis-
tance to applying no-fault to medical malpractice135 or attempt-
ing broader, government sponsored social welfare solutions. 
Critics have fastened on the costs of financing and administer-
ing such programs, and on the theoretical difficulty of identify-
ing or defining the compensable event. The insurance industry 
has argued vigorously that the cost of a mandatory no-fault 
medical malpractice insurance plan would be prohibitive be-
cause of an inability to eliminate claims for any worsening con-
dition following medical treatment.136 
Yet determining iatrogenic causation is an empirical question, 
little different in scope or kind from the fault question the tort 
system asks-which itself involves questions of causation. The 
strong American opposition to European-style solutions has 
deeper roots. Such proposals have little prospect of success in 
the near future, given prevailing American political attitudes. 137 
134. Although American no-fault auto insurance is generally a third party system 
based on fault, insureds look to their own insurer for economic damages. Where the 
other driver is unknown or uninsured, insureds look to their own insurer for 
noneconomic damages as well. 
135. Many of these proposals assume a third party system, in which the patient 
would still claim against the provider for damages stemming from the maloccurrence. 
Third party no-fault would only exacerbate the situation by increasing the number of 
compensable events tenfold though still retaining the essentially adversarial and circular 
third party (provider inclusive) approach, with its small pool of insureds. See P. DANZON, 
supra note 1, at 208-19. 
136. FMMIA Hearings, supra note 72, at 455-56 (statement of Robert Gilmore, Sen-
ior Vice Pres. of Legal Affairs, American Ins. Ass'n). O'Connell agrees: 
[G]rave difficulties would obviously confront any system of no-fault insurance 
that undertook to compensate all those injured by medical treatment. The main 
problem would be how to define and recognize the insured event .... Would it 
not be difficult in many instances to know whether the patient's injury resulted 
from treatment or from the condition which sent him to the health care provider 
in the first place? 
O'Connell, supra note 72, at 128. 
137. In light of the current political push towards "free enterprise" market solutions 
and contraction of the federal regulatory and welfare state apparatus, proposals to enact 
national health insurance or place the Department of Health and Human Services in the 
business of underwriting insurance seem like dinosaurs to many, if not most, legislators 
and constituents. See Moore & Hoff, supra note 93, at 121-22: "Any such scheme would 
effectively create a very broad health, safety, and life insurance program-a major social 
undertaking that would raise numerous problems of its own. . . . Such a broad no-fault 
approach would not and should not be popular in Congress, especially under the present 
fiscal circumstances." 
Broad, federally mandated solutions usually hurt the interests of the low income class 
by eliminating or severely restricting noneconomic damages. Such solutions also run 
counter to the deeply ingrained American tradition of state control over tort and insur-
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Unlike Europeans, Americans emphasize the importance of indi-
vidualism and private choices, and recoil from extension of gov-
ernment bureaucracy, intervention, and control, 138 particularly 
at the national level. 
D. Designated Compensable Events 
The most innovative American proposal is the Designated 
Compensable Event (DCE) approach. As developed in an ABA 
feasibility study139 inspired by a proposed prototype, Medical 
Adversity Insurance (MAI),140 the DCE system would promptly 
compensate certain predefined occurrences, without regard to 
fault. According to the DCE proposal, for most medical treat-
ments, researchers can isolate a subset of adverse outcomes that 
are usually avoidable under good quality care, from the general 
set of significant adverse outcomes. Patients claiming one of the 
listed injuries would receive scheduled no-fault benefits.141 
The DCE study tested the oft-repeated claim that a no-fault 
malpractice system would have great difficulty identifying the 
medical accident, as opposed to ordinary care and treatment 
ance reform. Law, A Consumer Perspective on Medical Malpractice, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 305, 318-21. They may thus elicit suspicion from conservatives, 
insurers, providers (who fear socialized medicine) and even common law tort lawyers 
(whose pivotal roles may be threatened by the modern trend towards replacement of the 
common law with ah administrative model). 
138. 
In Europe . . . the compensation picture is today increasingly dominated by the 
social security system .... The United States, on the other hand, seems bent on 
a very different route. There the federal social security system still makes virtu-
ally no contribution to the compensation of accident victims; even the prospects 
of a minimal national health programme are fading fast under the impact of 
current inflation and the widespread anti-tax sentiment. The tort system has 
therefore had to bear a proportionately larger share of the overall compensation 
effort than in European countries. 
Fleming, supra note 3, at 268 (footnote omitted). 
139. COMMISSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, DESIG-
NATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYSTEM: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (1979) [hereinafter DCE 
STUDY). 
140. See Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Ap-
proach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613 !NS. L.J. 69 (1974). 
141. 
Prepared ahead of time by medical researchers, . . . the lists of these adverse 
outcomes, or "designated compensable events," would be made the basis of a 
compensation system in which patients suffering listed outcomes would be paid 
scheduled benefits from insurance proceeds without the necessity of showing 
fault on the part of the individual provider. 
DCE STUDY, supra note 139, at 9. 
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which fails to ameliorate the patient's condition.142 DCE seeks to 
eliminate this causation problem by listing certain outcomes 
that will be considered compensable. 
A panel of expert physicians drew up a fairly comprehensive 
listing of DCE's arising out of general and orthopedic surgery. 
The primary criterion used was avoidability. As a concept for 
analyzing medical intervention, avoidability is meant to have a 
statistical validity: regardless of any individual outcome, "in a 
large number of situations the adverse outcome may be highly 
avoidable. "143 
Under the DCE approach, injuries or errors that are rectified 
during hospitalization and do not result in continuing disability 
are noncompensable, for they fail to meet a "minimum threshold 
of significance."144 Additionally, those patients suffering unlisted 
or intentional injuries could sue under the common law; provid-
ers would carry both DCE and liability insurance. 14~ 
Although the authors of the DCE study favor compulsory 
DCE legislation, they theorize that courts would uphold volun-
tary DCE insurance contracts. The main obstacles to elective 
DCE insurance would be the constitutional validity of a contrac-
tual waiver of one's right to sue, 148 and possible lack of incentive 
for providers and patients to join a new mode of insurance. 147 
Legislatively compelled DCE insurance would schedule dam-
ages in advance and assure prompt payment, thereby avoiding 
significant transaction costs such as litigation expenses and un-
necessary anguish. Damages would include medical expenses, 
lost wages, a schedule of diminished earning capacity, and a 
schedule of pain and suffering damages for certain DCE's con-
sidered susceptible to such damages. 148 Finally, the authors note 
almost casually that a "patients' option" approach could be 
taken to supplement the scheduled damages-that "patients 
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
143. DCE STUDY, supra note 139, at 28. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 71-72, 77-79. 
146. Id. See generally infra note 195 (discussing constitutional issues). 
147. As with the contractual (elective) neo-no-fault approach, the provider/insurer 
would have little incentive to utilize DCE insurance if only he would be bound because 
the plaintiff would sue in ordinary tort if he had a good negligence case and accept DCE 
benefits only where he faced an otherwise unfavorable outcome. The only fair way to 
institute these proposals is to limit equally the range of alternatives available to both 
defendant and plaintiff. 
148. DCE STUDY, supra note 139, at 62-65. 
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could elect, ahead of time, to pay extra for the right to receive 
add-ons for non-economic harm."149 
The DCE approach ignores the fact that virtually no two inju-
ries are exactly alike, so no two tort cases are exactly alike. The 
strength of the tort system lies primarily in its ability to adapt 
general principles of law to an almost infinite variety of fact sit-
uations. The DCE list will either be too narrow or too broad. If 
it is too narrow, then the vast majority of injuries that arise will 
not be easily assimilated to a DCE. The need for judgment as to 
whether the actual event is close enough to the designated event 
to bring the DCE coverage into effect essentially vitiates the 
usefulness of the concept. On the other hand, if one draws the 
list too broadly, almost any adverse outcome will be deemed to 
fall under a DCE, robbing the concept of its substance. 
If almost any injury would be compensable, then the system 
reduces to third party no-fault. Third party no-fault insurance 
would greatly increase the number of compensable injuries with-
out removing the provider middleman. The system would retain 
all the current problems of doctor-patient adversity and poor 
provider cost spreading, magnified by the increased number of 
claims. 
IV. FIRST PARTY No-FAULT MEDICAL MALQCCURRENCE 
INSURANCE (MMI) 
The optimum approach to the medical malpractice insurance 
problem is the introduction of a system of first party no-fault 
insurance, similar to the first party component of compulsory 
no-fault automobile insurance.1110 Under this system, state law 
would require patients entering a hospital for treatment either 
149. Id. at 65. This brief suggestion that first party insurance could be used to sup-
plement DCE indicates one of DCE's main failures: it continues to rely on the relatively 
inefficient third party insurance arrangement. 
150. No state has introduced pure no-fault auto insurance; usually, victims with inju-
ries over a certain level of severity can sue the injurer and recover from his third party 
(liability) insurer. See, e.g., Newson v. Hertz Corp., 164 N.J. Super. 141, 395 A.2d 902 
(1978). The analogy to MMI is clearer where the other driver is unknown, uninsured, or 
underinsured, because most no-fault auto insurance policies contain "uninsured motorist 
coverage," whereby the policyholder looks to his own carrier for all damages. By the 
terms of the policy, the award of noneconomic damages (for which the defendant's liabil-
ity carrier would ordinarily be responsible) is determined by arbitration. See, e.g., N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (West 1985). 
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to show proof of insurance or purchase a policy covering that 
particular course of treatment. m 
A. How the System Would Work 
Hospital patients lacking their own prior coverage would ei-
ther order coverage at the time of admission, or, if qualified, re-
ceive subsidized medical maloccurrence insurance. The insur-
ance charge would be treated exactly as any other medical 
expense on the hospital bill. For example, if the health care re-
cipient was poor or elderly, the federal government would pay 
the added expense just as it would any other expense covered by 
Medicaid or Medicare. m Once insured, patients would look to 
their own company for relief for iatrogenic maloccurrence.163 If 
unable to purchase private health insurance, those deemed sus-
ceptible to serious illness or hospitalizations could purchase in-
surance by entering an "assigned risk pool" formed by a state 
mandated Joint Underwriting Association.154 
Just as most no-fault automobile insurance policies must cross 
a minimum policy threshold of coverage per claim and per oc-
currence, first party MMI policies would have to provide at least 
a statutory minimum level of benefits. Hospital emergency 
rooms would automatically assign the minimum policy to uncon-
scious or disoriented patients through the assigned risk pool, as-
suming that the hospital was unable to verify their coverage.166 
151. Like DCE, MMI probably could not be based on an elective model, even with a 
collateral source rule. Because of the uncertainty of elective systems, providers would 
continue to carry full liability coverage, with little or no decrease in insurance costs. Too 
many patients would refuse to buy insurance, thinking they could collect against the 
provider anyway in the event of injury. See supra note 147. 
In addition, many hospitals might choose not to require or even offer such insurance. 
The state would have to intervene to provide for those without access to such coverage or 
those unable to afford it. 
152. Federal legislation would probably be needed to authorize MMI payment by 
Medicare and Medicaid. Until then, those states enacting MMI legislation would have to 
provide state MMI subsidization for the needy. 
153. Additionally, a spouse or child could be included under a family policy. 
154. Such Joint Underwriting Associations (JUA's) would provide insurance to those 
considered bad risks, or those otherwise unable to obtain insurance in the market. All 
writers of personal liability insurance within the state would be required to accept their 
fair share of such assigned risks as a condition of writing insurance in the state. Similar 
mechanisms are used to provide automobile insurance. Most states set up medical mal-
practice JUA's during the 1975 crisis, but few remain operative. See P. DANZON, supra 
note 1, at 112. 
155. Assuming the patient's name could be determined, a prior record of hospitaliza-
tion might alert the hospital as to his coverage; the patient might also be carrying his 
health insurance card. Of course, next of kin could either provide the information or sign 
1280 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:4 
Minimum policy amounts would provide a specified level of 
noneconomic damages to compensate subsidized or unconscious 
patients sufficiently. 
Poor patients might receive government subsidized minimum 
policies, though such patients could expand their coverage by 
adding their own funds to the government subsidy. A different 
statutory minimum might be appropriate to safeguard minor 
children, including prenatal newborns; parents could privately 
purchase whatever level of coverage they could afford, as long as 
the minimal statutory requirements were satisfied. 
In lieu of purchasing a policy, the law could permit competent 
incoming patients to sign common law tort rights waivers, bar-
ring suit for any injury that would ordinarily be covered by first 
party MMI. Even if constitutional,1116 however, permitting such a 
loophole would probably be ill-advised because the price of the 
minimum insurance policy would probably be small as compared 
to the risk.m Instead, to accommodate those who prefer to gam-
ble, a state might off er an even cheaper "medical expenses only" 
ultra-minimum policy, with fewer benefits than that provided 
unconscious and government subsidized patients.H8 The state 
would also have to decide whether to permit "claims made" poli-
cies in addition to the standard "occurrence policy."m 
Such flexibility is one of first party MMI's greatest strengths. 
It allows each individual to value his own damages in advance, 
which gives insurers a better idea of their overall exposure and 
permits greater actuarial credibility in determining insurance 
for the patient at any desired policy limit. If it were later discovered that the patient had 
his own coverage after all, the insurance assigned by the hospital would be considered 
void ab initio. 
156. See infra note 195. 
157. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
158. This Note takes the view that, in general, individual patients are the best judge 
of their insurance needs. Probably few patients would opt for the minimal coverage. New 
Jersey permitted auto insurers to offer drivers small rebates in return for waiving some 
noneconomic damage recovery, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West Supp. 1987), but few 
insureds seem to have selected this option. See Russo, Auto-Insurance Reform Is 
Needed, But Hasty Decisions in Trenton Could Make a Bad Situation Worse, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 2, 1986, §11, at 26, col. 3. 
159. The occurrence policy is the traditional medical malpractice policy. It covers any 
claims arising out of an injury incurred during the term of the policy, regardless of when 
such claims are filed. 
In contrast, a claims made policy covers only claims for injuries incurred and filed 
during the term of insurance. Such policies burden the provider with the risk of claims 
made years after the policy's expiration. The use of such policies has increased since the 
1975 crisis. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 91-92. 
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rates. 160 The policy's price would reflect choices as to the nature 
of the payment-whether lump sum or structured-and particu~ 
lar items covered. 
A standard contract arbitration clause would be included, 
both for questions of contract interpretation as well as for fixing 
the amount of damages due the policyholder in the event of a 
hospital accident. Routine arbitration panels, such as those sup-
plied by the American Arbitration Association for uninsured 
motorist cases, 161 would determine almost all disputes, including 
those in which the insurer queries whether a policyholder's in-
jury is a covered maloccurrence. 162 
The program would specifically exclude informed consent and 
intentional torts, 163 as well as ordinary, nonmalpractice tort 
160. Professor Ehrenzweig, in developing an early (third party) forerunner of DCE 
insurance, expressed a similar idea: 
As everybody is able to assess his own risk, if he considers his own "worth" in 
excess of the statutory award, he will be free, and indeed encouraged by hospital 
and physician, to take additional "hospital-accident insurance." The proposed 
scheme, which would fix the potential recovery, would thus be fairer to the well-
to-do patient than the present system under which the uncertainties of recovery 
inherent in tort liability and tort insurance make planning of protection 
impossible. 
Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" Insurance: A Needed First Step Toward 
the Displacement of Liability for "Medical Malpractice", 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 286 
(1964). 
161. See supra note 150. Anyone familiar with such arbitration hearings knows they 
are vastly more informal and swift than litigation. Without sacrificing due process fair-
ness or fact-finding accuracy, arbitration generates greatly reduced attorney fees while 
minimizing frustration and animosity. See generally Powsner & Hamermesh, Medical 
Malpractice Crisis the Second Time Around: Why Not Arbitrate?, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 283 
(1987). 
162. The insured would retain his common law right to sue the carrier for breach of 
contract, for violating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for acting 
in bad faith-an important check on the insurer, who may neither unreasonably refuse 
to settle nor cancel the policy in bad faith. See, e.g., Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 
App. 3d 951, 136 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1977). If the insurer raised the issue of lapsed or nonex-
istent coverage, the arbitration panel would decide this issue first. If the claimant lost 
this issue, she could refile against the JUA, upon payment or set-off of the premium that 
would have been due originally. 
163. Such dignitary torts are qualitatively different. They are not merely defects in 
the health care product, but willful violations of the patient's human rights-the classic 
substantive concern of tort law. The provider should be held directly responsible for 
such injuries, perhaps also for injuries involving gross negligence on the part of the 
provider. 
Under first party MMI, informed consent suits would be much less frequent than 
under the present system. Currently, most such cases are really medical maloccurrence 
cases in which the patient suffered an adverse medical outcome but cannot prove the 
provider's negligence. As an alternative, the patient sues for lack of informed consent, 
really hoping to obtain damages for his adverse outcome. 
This loophole in the tort law has distorted the theory of informed consent. Because the 
harm is not in the bad outcome, but in the failure to properly obtain the patient's con-
sent, the outcome is logically irrelevant to liability. Informed consent derives from the 
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claims against the provider, such as those arising out of negli-
gent maintenance of the premises. Those bringing such non-
MMI tort claims would sue the provider in a regular court of 
law, as they do under the present system. Therefore, providers 
would carry supplemental liability insurance164 to provide cover-
age for these fringe claims. The applicable class of providers 
would be established by statute;1611 injuries occurring in an am-
bulance, a school nurse's office, or a physical therapist's clinic 
would probably not be included, but those arising out of treat-
ment from a chiropractor probably would. 166 
The arbitration panels would separate the sequelae of medical 
treatment from the sequelae of the patient's condition by apply-
ing a standard of avoidability167 on an ad hoc, claim-by-claim 
basis, rather than in advance.168 Under the avoidability test, if a 
disability was more probably than not attributable to health 
care management, then provider causation, iatrogenicity, would 
tort of battery, not from negligence. For an excellent discussion of informed consent and 
its present distortion as a negligence action, see Riskin, supra note 20. 
Some damages should be available to the patient whose consent was not obtained, 
even if the outcome was perfectly acceptable to her. Id. at 603 n.126. Nevertheless, such 
damages will be relatively low, although varying with the egregiousness of the conduct 
and the mental distress inflicted. All but the most outraged patients will be satisfied with 
obtaining no-fault benefits because compensation for adverse outcome is the real motiva-
tion behind most informed consent claims. 
164. This is the opposite of the DCE proposal, which suggested making first party 
insurance options available to supplement the provider's third party liability insurance. 
165. Implementing MMI in two basic phases may be desirable: the first phase would 
implement MMI in hospitals and treatment centers; the second would extend the system 
to individual physicians and cover iatrogenic injuries occurring in the doctor's office. 
Once applied to individual physicians, a doctor who treated a patient without verifying 
whether the patient was insured could be held strictly liable in tort for any ordinarily 
covered iatrogenic injury, barring fraud on the patient's part or an emergency situation. 
At present, many doctors already require either payment in advance or proof of insur-
ance before rendering treatment. 
166. To extend the system beyond iatrogenic injuries occurring in the hospital or 
doctor's office would mean covering all injuries, regardless of how and where received. 
Such an extension would require the federal government to step in, abolish tort law, as 
done in New Zealand, and dictate that everyone be completely insured-an exponential 
jump from MMI and equivalent to comprehensive national health insurance, something 
this country is presently unwilling to consider. 
167. Although this may seem very novel to Americans, the Europeans applied similar 
standards as a form of strict liability to automobile accidents, long before no-fault insur-
ance existed. For example, the Italian Civil Code of 1942, Art. 2054, held the driver of a 
vehicle liable for any damages resulting from the vehicle's use "unless he can prove that 
he has done everything that was possible in order to avoid the damage." Tune, supra 
note 122, at 10 n.49; see also supra note 131 (Swedish Patient No-Fault Plan). 
168. Although MMI arbitration panels could consider all relevant evidence, including 
statistics, the panels would resolve each claim separately, based on its own particular 
facts. In contrast, under a DCE system, the determination of avoidability would be made 
in advance, using statistical formulas and a central research commission. 
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be established. The panel would presume that medical interven-
tion precipitated the adverse outcome unless the outcome was 
an unavoidable consequence of a preexisting condition or an un-
avoidable, reasonably anticipated result of the best treatment 
alternative. 169 
Unquestionably, the boundary problem-distinguishing ia-
trogenic injuries from those inevitably resulting from the preex-
isting condition-is significant. Yet MMI boundary problems are 
no more insurmountable for a fact finder than determinations of 
negligence or guilt. Courts and arbitrators are accustomed to 
drawing lines through complicated sets of facts, and the burden 
of proof never falls equally upon the parties. 
The avoidability approach, however, consciously places a 
heavy burden upon the insurer; proving a negative such as non-
avoidability is difficult, and in most cases, the presumption of 
coverage will prevail. The insurer can better absorb and spread 
claim costs; it is better able to predetermine the risk a given 
policyholder presents and match that risk to the price of a given 
amount of coverage. To lighten the insurer's burden of proof 
would increase transaction costs by injecting additional uncer-
tainty into the calculation. 170 Having paid for his coverage, the 
policyholder is entitled to the benefit of his bargain. 
169. The term "reasonably anticipated result" means the outcome was actually ex-
pected as a standard corollary of that particular treatment or the inevitable result of the 
malady that sent the patient to the provider in the first place. Thus, if a patient were 
undergoing radiation treatment for cancer, and as a result, suffered severe side effects, 
such effects would not be compensable because they were generally unavoidable. For the 
unavoidable side effect or risk defense to be successful, however, the insurer would need 
to show that the chosen course of treatment was the most reasonable alternative under 
the circumstances. 
To take another example, assume a patient was hospitalized for triple bypass heart 
surgery and died on the operating table. If he had had only a one in three chance of 
survival, the best alternative therapy carried only a one in five chance of survival, and 
the evidence indicates adherence to accepted medical standards in carrying out the pro-
cedure, then the patient's estate cannot claim the prescheduled MMI death benefits. 
One might conceive of MMI as applying a common sense standard to medical malprac-
tice: traditionally, a doctor only exonerates himself when he looks the patient (or her 
survivors) in the eye and says, "Sorry, we did all that reasonably could have been done." 
170. Because the proposed standard clearly favors the insured, the insurer would 
have more incentive to settle promptly. The insurer would also have an incentive to 
stipulate the issue of maloccurrence, rather than incur needless transactional costs by 
arbitrating it; the panel would then decide the disputed issues, whether damages or cov-
erage or both. Insurers would probably develop claim screening procedures to "weed out" 
the claims that clearly should or should not be paid. 
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Finally, although it would emphasize internal and external 
regulation to provide quality control, 171 MMI would also gener-
ate an incentive for hospitals to minimize risk. Because insurers 
would be better able to figure factors such as provider claims 
experience and resources into particular policies, hospitals would 
have an incentive to keep their maloccurrence rate down, or risk 
losing patients to hospitals with lower insurance costs.172 First 
party MMI would provide deterrence without adversity.173 
B. The Benefits of the System 
First party MMI would be more politically acceptable than 
the other comprehensive proposals. First, it benefits everyone: 
insurers, patients, providers-even attorneys. By benefiting pa-
tients, MMI probably assures its constitutionality. Second, it fits 
comfortably within the American traditions of favoring decen-
tralized market solutions, rather than massive federal 
undertakings. 
1. Insurers- The main problem for insurers under the cur-
rent system is the small pool of potential policyholders. There 
are simply not that many doctors, and relatively fewer hospitals. 
The policyholder pool is contracted further by dividing provid-
171. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. For the argument that the present 
malpractice system generates insignificant deterrence, see supra note 93 and accompany-
ing text. 
172. Some auto insurance policies are only valid in the state of purchase. Similarly, 
under MMI, an individual could purchase a policy limiting its coverage to treatment at a 
specified hospital; should the policyholder need treatment at a different facility, he could 
purchase a policy specifically for the particular hospital and treatment episode. 
Currently, hospitals incorporate insurance increases into their general costs; because 
consumers pay for their own insurance indirectly, consumers would have no way of com-
paring insurance costs even if experience rating were widespread. 
Under MMI, in contrast, the consumer could be offered a choice of policies with prices 
depending on the particular hospital covered. Insurers could rate individual health care 
facilities on the basis of past claims experience, adequacy of resources, and extent of 
supervisory review. See supra note 91. The consumer could choose the hospital with the 
lowest insurance cost-presumably, the hospital with the best safety record. Applying 
the HMO concept, an insurance company might decide to offer policies with special 
"group coverage" rates, allowing coverage for treatment by designated providers within a 
particular geographical area. The prospect of having the insurance market inform con-
sumers about comparative risks and allowing consumers to choose among providers 
would motivate providers to take quality assurance measures. 
173. Because of the statistical nature of such ratings, individual maloccurrences 
would have a relatively attenuated impact on the hospital's rating. Providers would co-
operate with patients to uncover and pursue bona fide MMI claims because satisfying 
patients with such good will services makes good business sense. 
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ers into specialties or categories that embrace various degrees of 
risk. 174 
Quite simply, the larger the pool over which losses are spread, 
the smaller the burden on each individual within the pool, and 
the greater the actuarial credibility in determining premium 
rates. By the law of large numbers, larger policyholder pools and 
larger claim pools translate into greater certainty of predic-
tion.1711 Add the fact that each MMI policy clearly delineates its 
loss limits, and the inescapable conclusion is that MMI would 
increase forecasting accuracy exponentially. Greater accuracy 
will mean that rates can be closely tailored to fit the actual 
claims picture, thereby reducing rate volatility.176 
About one-half million physicians practice in the United 
States, 177 a small number in comparison with the many millions 
of patients.178 Under an MMI system, gross premium income 
from the vast number of policies would overshadow the in-
creased number and frequency of claims. The greater number of 
MMI policyholders would enable insurers to collect a higher to-
tal premium than under the present system because the average 
price of each MMI policy would be much lower than that of the 
average malpractice insurance policy.179 In addition, the in-
surer's increased premium intake and greater forecasting accu-
racy would permit more profitable premium income investment, 
which would supplement lower transaction costs.180 
174. "The current practice of dividing physicians into as many as eight classes for 
rating purposes is undesirable and should be abandoned. Such a practice has, first, the 
effect of spreading very great risks over comparatively small numbers of physicians in 
the higher risk classes." R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 28. Even treating doctors homoge-
neously, however, does not solve the problem of too few physicians. 
175. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 89-90. 
176. Cf. supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (poor forecasting that significantly 
underestimated premium loss ratios partly responsible for large 1975 insurance cost 
increases.). 
177. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE.STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1987 90 (107th ed.). 
178. Over 18 million people are enrolled in HMO's alone. Id. 
179. Under the theory of the marginal utility of cumulative losses, see supra notes 6-
7, more can be charged if the burden is more widely spread. The greater total premium is 
justified by the utility of allowing losses to be more easily borne. First party MMI seems 
more expensive than the present system only if one ignores the cost of forcing uncom-
pensated victims to bear their own losses. 
180. First party MMI would greatly reduce today's massive litigation expenses. The 
heavily pro-claimant standard would probably discourage insurer opposition to all but 
clearly contrived or ineligible claims, while disputed claims would be decided by cost-
efficient arbitration. Furthermore, purchasing a composite policy covering health, disa-
bility, and medical maloccurrence would largely eliminate the inefficiency of overlapping 
coverage and permit more accurate insurance rate determination. 
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2. Providers- Instituting first party MMI would be particu-
lary beneficial for health care providers. Under the current sys-
tem, providers must suffer the opportunity cost of having to put 
up the premium money, while patients gradually reimburse 
them in small increments. Under the MMI proposal, providers 
would no longer carry the initial burden of high malpractice pre-
miums. Although providers would carry a supplemental liability 
policy, the cost of the supplemental coverage would be a fraction 
of the present cost of full malpractice insurance because almost 
all maloccurrences would be covered under the patient's own 
first party insurance. 181 
Of incalculably greater importance, however, is that the health 
care provider will once again be free to do his job without the 
sword of litigation hanging over his head.182 First party MMI 
would eliminate the psychic harm of the threat or actuality of 
litigation, as well as thawing the currently adversarial doctor-pa-
tient relationship. 183 When patients did claim, they would claim 
against their own carrier, not against the doctor; MMI claims 
would not allege fault, only causation. As a no-fault system, 
MMI would permit the doctor to publicly and impartially evalu-
ate his own work; without the threat of financial or reputational 
harm, providers would have no reason to withhold information 
from injured patients, or to subject patients to unnecessary diag-
nostic procedures. Finally, introducing MMI would encourage 
greater physician solidarity by eliminating the present specialist/ 
nonspecialist, high risk/low risk malpractice insurance rate 
classifications. 184 
3. Attorneys- Attorney support for MMI could be an addi-
tional asset. Under the current system, many plaintiffs' lawyers 
181. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
182. 
The greatest advantage of the proposed scheme would be that it would not only 
relieve the patient of the economic and emotional strain of protracted litigation 
requiring difficult or impossible proof, but would also relieve the defendant ... 
of a continuous threat crippling both sound experimentation and courageous 
treatment. 
Ehrenzweig, supra note 160, at 288-89 (discussing the analogous advantages of his pro-
posed "Hospital-Accident Insurance"). 
183. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
184. "[F]undamentally, such a scheme overlooks the deep interconnections among 
physicians within the health care system. In the modern system, all physicians are highly 
dependent on their colleagues, and the care of patients has become the responsibility of 
networks of physicians who collectively possess the required skills and knowledge." R. 
Fleming, supra note 31, at 28. In other words, why should the doctor who puts the preg-
nant patient under anesthesia pay a different amount than the doctor who delivers her 
baby? 
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shy away from malpractice cases; they are extremely difficult, 
expensive, and time consuming. The plaintiff often gets little or 
no compensation, leaving the attorney to absorb the tremendous 
expenditure of effort and resources. 1811 
First party MMI would not eliminate the tort system entirely, 
but where the common law was displaced, attorneys could re-
present claimants before the MMI arbitration panels. MMI 
would generate more claims than presently arise, though due to 
policy limits on recovery, MMI claims would usually be less se-
vere. Attorneys would be more willing to take these smaller 
cases because their disposition before the arbitration panels 
would be much less risky and taxing-almost routine.186 
The present system discourages the participation of compe-
tent but risk-averse attorneys, yet overcompensates those attor-
neys willing to take the risk. MMI would save transactional legal 
costs by employing a more efficient attorney compensation sys-
tem that replaced contingency fees with post hoc fee awards. 
Plaintiffs' attorneys would be adequately compensated for their 
services even if the claim, though bona fide, were unsuccessful. 
The insurer would pay the documented litigation costs of unsuc-
cessful bona fide claims not exceeding the policy limits, minus a 
policyholder deductible, and would incorporate the total cost of 
unsuccessful claims into its policies.187 
185. Because of the risks and expenses of medical malpractice litigation, the plaintiff 
side is largely the domain of a small group of specialists, because "competition tends to 
eliminate risk-averse attorneys from contingent fee litigation." P. DANZON, supra note 1, 
at 196. 
Even those attorneys who regularly represent medical malpractice claimants are more 
cautious in their case selection than is generally acknowledged. Because of this selectiv-
ity, some victims, particularly those with smaller claims, cannot obtain legal representa-
tion. See id. at 197; see also L. CHARFOOS, supra note 67, at 19-30. 
186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
187. Under a workers' compensation style system, the arbitration panel, or perhaps a 
separate reviewing board, would award the plaintiffs' attorneys reasonable attorneys' fees 
based on documented expenses and work. Although the attorney's award would not de-
pend upon the success of the claim, the merit of the claim would be a factor in determin-
ing the award. Bringing entirely frivolous claims would subject the attorney to sanctions. 
Cf. 82 AM. JuR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 646 (1976) ("[F]ees should not be fixed 
so low that capable attorneys will not be attracted to compensation cases, nor so high as 
to impair the compensation program; and in individual cases they should be reasonable 
in view of all the facts and circumstances."). 
Alternatively, statutory contingency fee schedules might be reduced to the greater of 
(1) 10% of gross recovery, or (2) the number of hours worked multiplied by an hourly 
billing rate (plus unreimbursed expenses). 
Post hoc awards would give attorneys incentive to pursue smaller or more difficult 
claims, on which their opportunity cost might otherwise exceed the statutory allotment. 
More importantly, MMI fee awards would reduce litigation costs, because under the cur-
rent system, awards and settlements are inflated to allow for contingency fees. MMI 
arbitration awards would be tailored to compensate the claimant's specific injuries; the 
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4. Patients- Under a system of first party MMI, many more 
victims would recover their losses, with much less delay and 
trauma, than under the current system. The MMI system elimi-
nates transaction costs by eliminating the provider-middleman 
and directly charging those who currently pay indirectly. Adding 
a greater incentive to settle quickly, and replacing costly, drawn 
out and unpredictable litigation with cheap, rapid arbitration, 
also reduces transaction and psychic costs. 
Under first party MMI, patients could choose the policies best 
suited to their particular needs. Low income patients would no 
longer have to subsidize the higher damage demands of the well-
to-do, 188 but subsidized patients would receive policies providing 
adequate noneconomic damages. Because relative standards of 
care would no longer be relevant, MMI would also eliminate the 
current tort system's discrimination against those who cannot 
afford the best doctors and facilities. 189 
Moreover, rating classifications could be based on one's 
health, the seriousness of the operation or treatment, 190 and the 
track record of any specified hospitals and physicians.191 Under 
the more efficient MMI system, subsidizing unhealthy patients 
would cost less than the current cost of subsidizing negligent 
physicians. 192 
plaintiff's legal fees would be awarded separately. The legal fees that, together with the 
award, exceeded the policy limits, would come out of the claimant's share. 
Although insurers would still be responsible for absorbing and spreading both sides' 
legal fees, by directly accepting the plaintiff's risk, insurers would no longer overcompen-
sate plaintiffs' attorneys for doing so. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 197 ("[C]ontingent 
fees on average will appear to overcompensate attorneys by 66 percent for their time 
spent .... [As a plaintiff,) you pay a premium if ... [you win the case) in order to 
avoid a loss if ... [you lose the case]."). 
188. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 160, at 286. 
189. See supra note 69. 
190. Individuals could purchase a policy specific to the upcoming treatment episode, 
or could purchase advance "umbrella" coverage, specifying a sliding scale schedule of 
recovery jimits depending upon the type of treatment received. Furthermore, the insur-
ers, rather than the provider organization, would have control over the relevant data 
base (the health and prior claims experience of the insured). Insurers might arrange to 
have prospective policyholders examined by a physician, as is often required for life in-
surance contracts. 
191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
192. The current system places relatively little reliance on provider claims experi-
ence. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Patients of high risk providers ulti-
mately pay the same insurance cost as patients of low risk providers, in effect receiving a 
subsidy. Although 58% of all physicians have never been subjected to a claim, 2.5% are 
responsible for 19.7% of all claims, and 19.3% are responsible for 72.2% of all claims. R. 
Fleming, supra note 31, at 11. 
Because MMI premiums are tailored to the individual patient's risk, the cost of subsi-
dizing high risk patients will be lower than the current risk subsidy cost. First, for the 
healthy to subsidize the unhealthy is probably more efficient than for the non-negligent 
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Finally, under the current system, many victims of medical 
malpractice receive little or no compensation, 193 either because 
they do not realize that they have a potential claim, or because 
providers are able to persuade unsophisticated victims to accept 
relatively paltry settlements. Under first party MMI, however, 
health care providers would have no reason to hide any informa-
tion from the patient, because the provider would no longer be 
held responsible for the injury.194 The health care provider 
would resume his traditional role as the patient's fiduciary, free 
of the mistrust and hostility that are all too common today. 
Then prearbitration discovery could take place in an atmosphere 
of candor and neutrality. 
C. Political and Constitutional Feasibility 
Like its predecessor cousins, workers' compensation and no-
fault automobile insurance, first party no-fault medical maloc-
currence insurance would be challenged and ultimately upheld 
on both political and constitutional grounds. 
1. Constitutionality- Like workers' compensation and no-
fault automobile insurance, first party MMI entails the legisla-
tive abrogation of certain common law tort remedies, in return 
for certain other rights and remedies. The legislature can consti-
tutionally abrogate common law rights to further important leg-
islative policies, if doing so yields a genuine quid pro quo.1911 
doctor's patients to subsidize the negligent doctor's patients. Second, policy limitations 
on recovery will limit overall loss. Third, many high risk policyholders will be able to 
afford their own private, voluntary coverage. 
193. See supra note 72. 
194. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Admittedly, sustaining injury dis-
courages patients from using the same provider in the future, regardless of whether or 
not the injury was caused by negligence. Yet the reputational damage under MMI would 
be slight compared to that occurring under the present system, which publicly pits pro-
vider against patient, irrevocably destroying many formerly close relationships. 
195. The United States Supreme Court has essentially left this issue to the states, to 
be determined according to state constitutional law. One of the more well-known state 
constitutional decisions is Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). In Kluger, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court held the no-fault automobile insurance law's provisions for voluntary 
waiver of common law tort rights unconstitutional under the state constitution because 
the legislature failed to provide a reasonable compensation alternative. Id. at 4. 
The Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed and explained Kluger in Acton v. Ft. Lauder-
dale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1983). Acton upheld the state's workers' compensation 
laws as "a reasonable alternative to tort litigation." Although workers' compensation 
"may disadvantage some workers," it extends greater benefits to others and generally 
"continues to afford substantial advantages to injured workers, including full medical 
care and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability without their having to endure 
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In return for abolishing the patient's common law tort rights 
against the health care provider, the legislature is expanding the 
range and increasing the probability of patient compensation. If 
anything, first party MMI would work to the patient's advan-
tage; prior to treatment, the rational patient would choose 
prompt, satisfactory compensation under MMI over the delay, 
uncertainty, and anxiety of the current tort system. A written 
record of arbitration hearings and arbitration fact-findings-for 
the benefit of reviewing courts-would provide due process pro-
tection. Policyholders would also retain their common law rights 
to sue their insurer for breach of contract and an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, and for breach of any fiduci-
ary duties toward the insured. 
2. Political feasibility- First party MMI is a politically fea-
sible solution to the medical malpractice problem. First, other 
approaches unduly favor some groups at the expense of others. 
In contrast, the first party no-fault plan seems to benefit all con-
cerned; no interest group suffers at another's expense. 
Second, the plan is in keeping with the American traditions of 
decentralization, individualism, and entrepreneurial spirit. Na-
tional uniformity is not required; an MMI program would be ad-
ministered more efficiently on a state-by-state basis. Nor is cen-
tralized control by a giant government agency necessary: rather 
than placing the government in the business of underwriting in-
surance, first party MMI encourages competition. 
Under the present system, the comparatively small number of 
providers can support only a correspondingly small number of 
insurers. First party no-fault would open up a huge insurance 
market to cater to the needs of the millions of patients suddenly 
needing no-fault health insurance. Without a monopolistic 
union, such as a state medical society, to bestow franchises to a 
single bidder, the vast sales potential would encourage more in-
surance companies to enter the market. By keeping rates at a 
minimum, increased competition would benefit the health care 
consumer.196 
the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation." Id. at 1284. The same reasoning seems 
equally applicable to first party MMI. 
196. As a matter of routine, hospitals might arrange to make a variety of policies 
from various companies available to incoming patients. In view of the particular fiduci-
ary duties of insurance agents and brokers towards policyholders, however, hospitals 
would more appropriately provide space for insurance agencies to sell the policies, 
thereby avoiding potential provider-patient conflicts of interest. 
A more likely practice would be for hospitals to insist that patients arrange their own 
private insurance elsewhere, prior to admission, unless the patient was subsidized, a mi-
nor, incompetent, or unconscious (including emergency cases), or high risk and, there-
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Last, because of its similarity to such pervasive, established 
types of first party, no-fault insurance as health, disability, auto-
mobile, and even life insurance, MMI would not require inordi-
nate changes in the structure or regulation of the insurance in-
dustry. MMI coverage could usually be derived from health 
insurance sources. Current Blue Cross members, for example, 
might simply be assessed an additional surcharge if they chose 
to obtain their, MMI coverage from Blue Cross. Employee bar-
gaining units could negotiate with their respective employers 
over the a~ditional coverage as they would any other employee 
benefit.197 
CONCLUSION 
Victims of maloccurrence evoke our sympathies as much as do 
victims of malpractice.198 Although it is not yet feasible to 
spread the burden of all undeserved injuries and afflictions 
through tax or insurance mechanisms, we can and should shift 
the burden of losses proximately resulting from a particular 
treatment episode. 
Under a first party medical maloccurrence insurance system, 
individuals would insure themselves against injuries resulting 
from treatment and lose their common law right to sue the pro-
vider for malpractice. Doctor-patient adversity would be elimi-
nated, and the burden of high malpractice premiums would be 
removed from the health care provider. By vastly increasing the 
pool of insureds and delineating the maximum loss exposure, a 
first party MMI system would permit more accurate actuarial 
forecasting, and spread avoidable iatrogenic losses more fairly 
and efficiently than the current, haphazard tort system. And 
under an MMI system, patients would normally receive prompt, 
adequate compensation for an expanded range of injuries. 
With its lower transaction costs, provider exemption, and 
broader, more proportionate victim compensation, no-fault med-
fore, unable to purchase private affordable insurance. In such cases, the hospital would 
assign the patient to the assigned risk pool. The patient would be given a standard mini-
mum policy appropriate for the patient's classification, as mandated by statute, and the 
policy would be assigned at random to one of the companies participating in the Joint 
Underwriting Association. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
197. According to Danzon, "more than 85% of private health insurance is employ-
ment-based." P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 211. 
198. R. Fleming, supra note 31, at 30. 
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ical maloccurrence insurance offers a way out of the present 
medical malpractice quandary. 
-Larry M. Pollack 
